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The	  UK	  Naval	  Nuclear	  Propulsion	  Programme	  (NNPP)	  is	  highly	  dependent	  upon	  
the	  United	  States	  for	  reactor	  technology	  and,	  in	  the	  past,	  highly	  enriched	  
uranium	  (HEU)	  for	  its	  submarine	  reactor	  cores.	  The	  extent	  of	  this	  dependency	  is	  
exemplified	  in	  the	  recent	  transfer	  of	  reactor	  design	  and	  technology	  from	  the	  US	  
to	  aid	  development	  of	  the	  UK’s	  third	  generation	  naval	  nuclear	  reactor,	  the	  PWR3,	  
intended	  to	  power	  the	  UK’s	  planned	  ‘Successor’	  ballistic	  missile	  submarine	  fleet.	  
The	  UK	  is	  highly	  unlikely	  to	  deviate	  from	  US	  reactor	  technology	  based	  on	  HEU	  
fuel	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  this	  dependency	  and	  the	  limited	  perceived	  benefits	  of	  
moving	  to	  a	  reactor	  fuelled	  with	  low	  enriched	  uranium	  (LEU)	  following	  the	  
French	  example.	  Independent	  exploration,	  development	  and	  research	  reactor	  
testing	  of	  LEU	  fuel	  for	  next	  generation	  attack	  submarines	  (SSNs)	  or	  ballistic	  
missile	  submarines	  (SSBNs)	  is	  therefore	  highly	  unlikely.	  	  
	  
Nevertheless,	  the	  UK	  should	  carefully	  consider	  the	  consequences	  of	  being	  one	  of	  
only	  two	  countries	  (with	  the	  United	  States)	  that	  uses	  weapon	  grade	  uranium	  for	  
naval	  propulsion.1	  As	  one	  of	  five	  recognised	  nuclear	  weapon	  states	  (NWS)	  under	  
the	  1968	  Nuclear	  Non-­‐Proliferation	  Treaty	  (NPT)	  the	  UK	  faces	  no	  legal	  sanction	  
from	  its	  continued	  possession,	  production	  and	  deployment	  of	  nuclear	  weapons	  
and	  the	  weapon	  grade	  uranium	  and	  plutonium	  therein.	  Under	  Article	  III	  of	  the	  
NPT	  all	  non-­‐nuclear	  weapon	  states	  (NNWS)	  parties	  to	  the	  Treaty	  are	  required	  to	  
accept	  safeguards	  to	  verify	  fulfillment	  of	  NPT	  obligations	  not	  to	  acquire	  or	  
manufacture	  nuclear	  weapons	  or	  other	  nuclear	  explosive	  devices.	  A	  safeguards	  
agreement	  is	  negotiated	  and	  concluded	  with	  the	  International	  Atomic	  Energy	  
Agency	  (IAEA)	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  Agency's	  safeguards	  system.	  The	  five	  NWS	  
are	  not	  subject	  to	  Article	  III	  and	  are	  not	  required	  to	  negotiate	  a	  safeguards	  
agreement	  with	  the	  IAEA.	  They	  are	  free	  to	  use	  HEU	  to	  fuel	  nuclear	  weapons	  and	  
naval	  nuclear	  reactors	  and	  they	  are	  not	  under	  any	  legal	  obligation	  to	  safeguard	  
weapon-­‐usable	  fissile	  material	  declared	  to	  their	  military	  programmes,	  including	  
HEU.	  All	  other	  NNWS	  parties	  to	  the	  NPT	  are	  legally	  prohibited	  from	  developing	  
or	  acquiring	  nuclear	  weapons	  and	  any	  production	  of	  plutonium	  and	  enriched	  
uranium	  for	  civil	  nuclear	  reactor	  programmes	  is	  subject	  to	  international	  
safeguards	  verified	  by	  the	  IAEA	  with	  one	  exception:	  naval	  nuclear	  fuel.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
*	  This	  paper	  was	  commissioned	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Task	  Force	  on	  Naval	  Nuclear	  Reactors	  convened	  by	  
the	  Federation	  of	  American	  Scientists	  and	  funded	  by	  the	  John	  D.	  and	  Catherine	  T.	  MacArthur	  
Foundation.	  The	  author	  thanks	  those	  that	  have	  responded	  to	  questions	  and	  drafts,	  in	  particular	  
Paul	  Ingram	  and	  Charles	  Ferguson.	  Any	  inaccuracies	  are	  the	  author’s	  own.	  Further	  comments	  are	  
welcomed	  at	  nick.ritchie@york.ac.uk.	  
1	  Chunyan	  Ma	  and	  Frank	  von	  Hippel,	  ‘Ending	  the	  Production	  of	  Highly	  Enriched	  Uranium	  for	  
Naval	  Reactors,’	  The	  Nonproliferation	  Review,	  Spring	  2001.	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IAEA	  safeguards	  agreements	  with	  NNWS	  (INFCIRC/153	  (Corrected))	  permit	  
suspension	  of	  safeguards	  for	  nuclear	  material	  for	  ‘non-­‐proscribed	  military	  
activity’.	  This	  means	  that	  NNWS’	  can	  legally	  withdraw	  uranium	  of	  whatever	  level	  
of	  enrichment	  from	  safeguarded	  facilities	  for	  use	  in	  an	  unsafeguarded	  naval	  
nuclear	  reactor	  programme,	  thereby	  creating	  nuclear	  weapon	  proliferation	  
opportunities	  and	  risks.	  This	  has	  been	  described	  as	  a	  major	  ‘loophole’	  in	  the	  
nuclear	  non-­‐proliferation	  regime	  since	  a	  NNWS	  could	  choose	  to	  manufacture	  
highly	  enriched	  uranium	  for	  a	  covert	  weapon	  programme	  under	  the	  guise	  of	  a	  
legitimate	  naval	  nuclear	  reactor	  programme.2	  	  
	  
This	  loophole	  could	  conceivably	  be	  closed	  through,	  inter	  alia:	  
• A	  universal	  legal	  prohibition	  on	  HEU-­‐fuelled	  naval	  reactors	  requiring	  the	  
development	  of	  LEU	  fuels	  and	  reactor	  cores	  by	  states	  that	  currently	  use	  
HEU.	  	  
• A	  legal	  prohibition	  on	  the	  diversion	  of	  HEU	  to	  naval	  nuclear	  reactor	  
programmes	  in	  NNWS	  only.	  
• Unilateral	  or	  multilateral	  voluntary	  phase	  out	  of	  HEU	  in	  naval	  nuclear	  
reactor	  programmes	  led	  by	  the	  UK	  and	  US	  as	  part	  of	  a	  diplomatic	  
initiative	  to	  establish	  an	  international	  norm	  against	  this	  practice	  
comparable	  to	  US-­‐led	  international	  efforts	  to	  convert	  HEU-­‐fuelled	  civilian	  
research	  reactors	  to	  LEU.	  
	  
The	  political	  prospects	  for	  these	  three	  responses	  are	  currently	  slim,	  at	  best.	  A	  
fourth	  intermediate	  response	  based	  on	  the	  development	  of	  a	  safeguards	  regime	  
for	  HEU	  in	  naval	  nuclear	  fuel	  cycles	  is,	  however,	  perhaps	  a	  more	  viable	  
proposition	  and	  one	  that	  could	  be	  taken	  forward	  by	  the	  UK.	  This	  is	  the	  focus	  of	  
this	  paper	  and	  it	  is	  explored	  in	  four	  parts.	  The	  first	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  
UK’s	  NNPP	  and	  dependency	  on	  the	  US.	  The	  second	  details	  the	  UK’s	  HEU	  naval	  
nuclear	  fuel	  cycle.	  The	  third	  explores	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  UK	  NNPP	  safeguards	  
study.	  The	  fourth	  section	  examines	  the	  verification	  of	  a	  UK	  NNPP	  fuel	  cycle	  
declaration.	  The	  conclusion	  highlights	  some	  of	  the	  challenges	  involved.	  
	  
The	  purpose	  of	  the	  paper	  is	  to	  make	  the	  case	  that	  there	  exists	  a	  genuine	  and	  
important	  opportunity	  for	  the	  UK	  to	  examine	  the	  modalities	  and	  practical	  impact	  
of	  a	  transparency	  and	  safeguards	  regime	  for	  its	  naval	  nuclear	  fuel	  cycle.	  The	  
purpose,	  here,	  would	  be	  to	  establish	  international	  best	  practice	  and	  new	  norms	  
of	  responsible	  nuclear	  behaviour	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  use	  of	  HEU	  that	  can	  be	  
legitimately	  removed	  from	  IAEA	  safeguards	  in	  NNWS	  for	  non-­‐proscribed	  
military	  uses,	  namely	  a	  naval	  nuclear	  reactor	  programme.	  	  
	  
1.	  UK	  dependency	  on	  the	  US	  NNPP	  
The	  UK	  fuels	  its	  current	  Trafalgar-­‐class	  and	  Astute-­‐class	  attack	  submarines	  
(SSNs)	  and	  its	  Vanguard-­‐class	  ballistic	  missile	  submarines	  (SSBNs)	  with	  highly	  
enriched	  uranium	  fuel.	  It	  is	  currently	  developing	  its	  next	  generation	  nuclear	  
propulsion	  reactor	  to	  power	  the	  planned	  Successor	  submarines	  that	  will	  replace	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Greg	  Thielmann	  and	  Serena	  Kelleher-­‐Vergantini,	  ‘The	  Naval	  Nuclear	  Reactor	  Threat	  to	  the	  NPT’,	  
Threat	  Assessment	  Brief,	  Arms	  Control	  Association,	  Washington,	  D.C.,	  24	  July	  2013.	  Available	  at	  
<https://www.armscontrol.org/files/TAB_Naval_Nuclear_Reactor_Threat_to_the_NPT_2013.pdf>	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the	  Vanguard-­‐class.	  Nuclear	  propulsion	  technology	  is	  highly	  classified.	  In	  the	  UK	  
it	  is	  treated	  with	  even	  greater	  sensitivity	  than	  those	  technologies	  associated	  with	  
the	  production	  of	  nuclear	  warheads.	  	  
	  
The	  UK’s	  Naval	  Nuclear	  Propulsion	  Programme	  is	  closely	  tied	  to	  the	  United	  
States.	  The	  United	  States	  supplied	  the	  UK	  with	  its	  first	  naval	  nuclear	  reactor	  and	  
has	  supplied	  fissile	  material	  for	  core	  fabrication.	  US	  assistance	  to	  the	  UK	  NNPP	  
has	  been	  part	  of	  a	  wider	  programme	  of	  military	  nuclear	  cooperation	  that	  dates	  
back	  to	  the	  1940s	  Manhattan	  project.	  Cooperation	  abruptly	  ended	  in	  1946	  when	  
the	  US	  Congress	  passed	  the	  Atomic	  Energy	  Act	  (the	  McMahon	  Act)	  that	  severely	  
limited	  the	  transfer	  of	  restricted	  nuclear	  information	  and	  materials	  to	  any	  other	  
state,	  causing	  a	  major	  rift	  with	  its	  wartime	  ally	  in	  London.	  Negotiations	  to	  re-­‐
establish	  exchange	  of	  military	  atomic	  defence	  information,	  materials	  and	  
technology	  began	  after	  an	  independent	  UK	  nuclear	  weapons	  programme	  tested	  
its	  first	  atom	  bomb	  in	  1952	  and	  hydrogen	  bomb	  in	  1957.	  Britain’s	  nuclear	  
dependence	  on	  the	  United	  States	  was	  then	  cemented	  in	  the	  1958	  Mutual	  Defence	  
Agreement	  (MDA)	  and	  five	  years	  later	  the	  1963	  Polaris	  Sales	  Agreement	  (PSA).	  
The	  MDA	  allowed	  for	  the	  exchange	  of	  naval	  nuclear	  propulsion	  technology	  
between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  UK.	  The	  UK	  had	  already	  initiated	  an	  indigenous	  
NNPP	  in	  1956	  a	  year	  before	  the	  decisive	  H-­‐bomb	  test,	  but	  by	  then	  the	  United	  
States	  programme	  was	  already	  developing	  its	  fifth	  generation	  naval	  reactor.	  
After	  a	  series	  of	  exchange	  visits	  in	  1957-­‐58	  the	  United	  States	  agreed	  to	  supply	  
the	  UK	  with	  one	  complete	  submarine	  nuclear	  reactor	  plant.	  This	  was	  the	  latest	  
S5W	  pressurised	  water	  reactor	  (PWR)	  design	  for	  the	  US	  Skipjack-­‐class	  
submarine.	  The	  S5W	  went	  on	  to	  power	  a	  total	  of	  98	  US	  submarines,	  including	  
different	  classes	  of	  SSNs	  and	  the	  Polaris	  SSBN	  fleet.3	  	  
	  
The	  agreement	  reached	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  MDA	  involved	  the	  transfer	  of	  
reactor	  technology	  and	  manufacturing	  expertise	  from	  Westinghouse	  in	  the	  
United	  States	  to	  Rolls	  Royce	  in	  the	  UK.	  This	  enabled	  the	  UK	  to	  deploy	  its	  first	  
nuclear-­‐powered	  submarine,	  HMS	  Dreadnought,	  several	  years	  earlier	  than	  
originally	  envisaged.4	  HMS	  Dreadnought	  was	  launched	  in	  1960	  and	  
commissioned	  into	  service	  in	  1963.	  Under	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  agreement	  
cooperation	  on	  nuclear	  propulsion	  came	  to	  an	  end	  in	  mid-­‐1963	  exactly	  one	  year	  
after	  the	  UK’s	  S5W	  plant	  became	  operational.	  NNPP	  cooperation	  was	  terminated	  
as	  a	  condition	  of	  the	  transfer	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  future	  UK	  operational,	  design	  
and	  safety	  independence.5	  The	  S5W	  reactor	  was	  fuelled	  with	  a	  core	  enriched	  in	  
235U	  to	  between	  93	  and	  97%.6	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Vice	  Admiral	  Sir	  Robert	  Hill,	  ‘Admiral	  Hyman	  G	  Rickover	  USN	  and	  the	  UK	  Nuclear	  Submarine	  
Propulsion	  Programme’,	  Thomas	  Lowe	  Gray	  Memorial	  Lecture	  presented	  to	  the	  Institution	  of	  
Mechanical	  Engineers,	  19	  April	  2005.	  
4	  Steve	  Ludlam,	  ‘The	  Role	  of	  Nuclear	  Submarine	  Propulsion’,	  in	  P.	  Cornish	  and	  J.	  Mackby,	  U.S.-­‐UK	  
Nuclear	  Cooperation	  After	  50	  Years	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  CSIS	  Press,	  2008),	  p.	  255.	  
5	  Interview	  with	  R.	  Hill,	  former	  Chief	  Naval	  Engineer	  Officer,	  Royal	  Navy,	  in	  .P.	  Cornish	  and	  J.	  
Mackby,	  U.S.-­‐UK	  Nuclear	  Cooperation	  After	  50	  Years	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  CSIS	  Press,	  2008),	  p.	  367.	  
6	  Some	  reports	  say	  93%,	  some	  slightly	  higher.	  Military	  uranium	  for	  US	  naval	  reactors	  has	  
previously	  been	  enriched	  to	  97%	  235U.	  Testimony	  of	  Admiral	  McKee,	  Procurement	  and	  military	  
Nuclear	  Systems	  subcommittee,	  House	  of	  Representatives	  Committee	  on	  Armed	  Services,	  
Hearing	  on	  H.R.4526	  Department	  of	  Energy	  National	  Security	  Authorizations	  Act	  FY1987-­‐88,	  20	  
February	  1986,	  p.	  26.	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The	  UK’s	  first	  indigenous	  plant	  and	  core	  (PWR1)	  based	  on	  the	  S5W	  
Westinghouse	  design	  was	  built	  by	  Rolls	  Royce	  and	  deployed	  in	  the	  attack	  
submarine	  HMS	  Valiant	  in	  1966.	  Three	  sets	  of	  cores	  were	  developed	  for	  PWR1.	  
Core	  1	  powered	  the	  UK’s	  Valiant-­‐class	  SSNs	  and	  Resolution-­‐class	  SSBNs	  that	  
carried	  the	  US	  Polaris	  strategic	  weapon	  system,	  core	  2	  powered	  the	  Churchill-­‐
class	  SSNs,	  and	  core	  3	  powered	  the	  Swiftsure	  and	  Trafalgar-­‐class	  SSNs.	  The	  
current	  PWR2	  reactor	  was	  designed	  for	  the	  UK’s	  Vanguard-­‐class	  SSBNs	  that	  
entered	  service	  in	  the	  1990s	  to	  replace	  the	  Resolution-­‐class	  and	  carry	  the	  US	  
Trident	  strategic	  weapon	  system.	  Design	  work	  began	  in	  1977	  and	  the	  first	  PWR2	  
reactor	  was	  completed	  in	  1985	  with	  testing	  beginning	  in	  August	  1987.	  The	  
current	  PWR2	  core	  design,	  ‘Core	  H’,	  has	  been	  designed	  to	  last	  the	  lifetime	  of	  the	  
reactor	  (25-­‐30	  years)	  thereby	  eliminating	  costly	  mid-­‐life	  reactor	  refuelling.	  	  Core	  
H	  fuels	  the	  new	  Astute-­‐class	  SSNs	  and	  the	  four	  Vanguard-­‐class	  SSBNs	  were	  fitted	  
with	  the	  core	  during	  their	  long	  overhaul	  and	  refuelling	  refits	  between	  2002	  and	  
2012.7	  	  
	  
UK	  reliance	  on	  US	  NNPP	  expertise	  is	  set	  to	  deepen	  with	  the	  development	  of	  a	  
new	  PWR3	  reactor	  for	  the	  planned	  Successor	  SSBN	  announced	  in	  the	  coalition	  
government’s	  Submarine	  Initial	  Gate	  Parliamentary	  Report	  in	  May	  2011.8	  MoD’s	  
Defence	  Board	  said	  the	  PWR3	  would	  be	  ‘based	  on	  a	  modern	  US	  plant’9	  and	  US	  
support	  provided	  ‘independent	  peer	  review	  of	  the	  UK’s	  NNPP	  capability	  and	  
helped	  to	  optimise	  its	  PWR3	  concept	  design.’10	  In	  2012	  the	  US	  Navy	  said:	  ‘Naval	  
Reactors	  is	  providing	  the	  UK	  Ministry	  of	  Defence	  with	  US	  naval	  nuclear	  
propulsion	  technology	  to	  facilitate	  development	  of	  the	  naval	  nuclear	  propulsion	  
plant	  for	  the	  UK’s	  next	  generation	  SUCCESSOR	  ballistic	  missile	  submarine’.11	  It	  
has	  been	  suggested	  that	  MoD	  has	  been	  ‘given	  visibility	  of	  the	  S9G	  reactor	  design	  
that	  equips	  the	  US	  Navy's	  latest	  Virginia-­‐Class	  nuclear-­‐powered	  attack	  
submarines’.12	  PWR3	  will	  in	  all	  likelihood	  power	  the	  new	  Successor	  flotilla	  
pending	  parliamentary	  approval	  at	  the	  ‘main	  gate’	  investment	  decision	  in	  2016	  
and	  possibly	  the	  next	  generation	  SSN	  currently	  dubbed	  Maritime	  Underwater	  
Future	  Capability	  (MUFC)	  depending	  on	  the	  size	  of	  submarine.13	  The	  US-­‐UK	  MDA	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  The	  Vanguard-­‐class	  is	  currently	  scheduled	  to	  be	  replaced	  by	  the	  new	  ‘Successor’	  SSBN	  
beginning	  2028	  when	  HMS	  Vanguard	  is	  due	  to	  retire.	  
8	  Ministry	  of	  Defence,	  The	  United	  Kingdom’s	  Future	  Nuclear	  Deterrent:	  The	  Submarine	  Initial	  
Gate	  Parliamentary	  Report	  (London:	  Ministry	  of	  Defence,	  2011).	  
9	  Defence	  Board	  09(62)	  Successor	  Submarine	  Project,	  Note	  by	  the	  Assistant	  Secretary,	  
DNSR/22/11/2,	  4	  November	  2009,	  http://robedwards.typepad.com/files/declassified-­‐report-­‐to-­‐
mod-­‐defence-­‐board.pdf	  date	  accessed	  15	  February	  2015.	  
10	  Chris	  Palmer,	  ‘Management	  of	  Key	  Technologies	  in	  the	  UK	  Naval	  Nuclear	  Propulsion	  
Programme’,	  presentation	  at	  the	  CSIS	  Project	  on	  Nuclear	  Issues	  (PONI)	  Capstone	  Conference	  
2011,	  US	  Strategic	  Command,	  6	  December	  2011.	  
11	  Roland	  O’Rourke,	  Navy	  Ohio	  Replacement	  (SSBN[X])	  Ballistic	  Missile	  Submarine	  Program:	  
Background	  and	  Issues	  for	  Congress	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Congressional	  Research	  Service,	  Library	  of	  
Congress,	  2013),	  p.	  8.	  O’Rourke’s	  source	  is	  ‘E-­‐mail	  to	  CRS	  from	  Navy	  Office	  of	  Legislative	  Affairs,	  
June	  25,	  2012.	  
12	  Julian	  Turner,	  ‘Deep	  impact:	  inside	  the	  UK's	  new	  Successor-­‐Class	  nuclear	  submarine’,	  Naval-­‐
Technology.com,	  30	  July	  2013.	  Available	  at	  http://www.naval-­‐technology.com/features/feature-­‐
nuclear-­‐submarine-­‐successor-­‐uk-­‐royal-­‐navy/	  
13	  Rear	  Admiral	  Andrew	  Mathews,	  ‘Showing	  the	  US	  the	  way’,	  talk	  at	  the	  Royal	  United	  Services	  
Institute,	  London,	  January	  17,	  2008.	  
The	  UK	  Naval	  Nuclear	  Propulsion	  Programme	  
	   5	  
is	  renewed	  every	  10	  years.	  In	  the	  latest	  update	  negotiated	  and	  agreed	  in	  July	  
2014	  Article	  III	  of	  the	  treaty	  was	  modified	  to	  authorize	  transfer	  of	  new	  reactor	  
technology,	  spare	  parts,	  replacement	  cores	  and	  fuel	  elements.14	  The	  original	  text	  
of	  the	  treaty	  referred	  to	  the	  transfer	  by	  sale	  of	  only	  one	  complete	  submarine	  
nuclear	  propulsion	  plant	  (the	  original	  S5W).	  
	  
The	  UK	  has	  also	  been	  dependent	  upon	  the	  United	  States	  for	  special	  nuclear	  
materials	  (highly	  enriched	  uranium	  and	  plutonium)	  and	  tritium	  gas	  for	  its	  
nuclear	  warhead	  and	  nuclear	  propulsion	  programmes.	  The	  UK	  initially	  obtained	  
HEU	  for	  its	  military	  programme	  from	  its	  gas	  diffusion	  plant	  at	  Capenhurst.	  
Capenhurst	  was	  established	  as	  the	  sole	  UK	  uranium	  enrichment	  site	  for	  both	  civil	  
and	  military	  applications.	  This	  began	  in	  1952,	  but	  production	  of	  HEU	  for	  military	  
purposes	  ended	  a	  decade	  later	  in	  1962.15	  Since	  then	  the	  UK	  has	  received	  HEU	  for	  
both	  its	  warhead	  programme	  and	  NNPP	  through	  exchanges	  of	  special	  nuclear	  
material	  with	  the	  US	  Department	  of	  Energy	  under	  the	  MDA.	  The	  UK	  imported	  
natural	  uranium	  ore	  concentrate	  from	  the	  United	  States,	  Australia,	  South	  Africa,	  
Namibia,	  Belgian	  Congo	  and	  Canada16	  and	  converted	  it	  into	  uranium	  
hexafluoride	  (UF6)	  at	  the	  UK’s	  Springfields	  site	  in	  Lancashire.	  UK	  hex	  was	  then	  
shipped	  to	  the	  United	  States	  for	  enrichment	  at	  the	  US	  Portsmouth	  Gaseous	  
Diffusion	  Plant	  in	  Piketon,	  Ohio.17	  HEU	  enriched	  to	  between	  93-­‐97%	  in	  235U	  was	  
transported	  back	  to	  the	  UK	  by	  military	  aircraft.	  
	  
In	  2000	  the	  UK	  provided	  details	  of	  three	  ‘barters’	  with	  the	  United	  States	  of	  
special	  nuclear	  materials	  between	  1960	  and	  1979.	  The	  UK	  supplied	  
approximately	  5.4	  tonnes	  of	  plutonium	  and	  received	  in	  exchange	  6.7kg	  of	  tritium	  
and	  7.5	  tonnes	  HEU	  for	  the	  defence	  nuclear	  programme,	  including	  NNPP.18	  
Further	  contracts	  with	  the	  US	  Department	  of	  Energy	  to	  supply	  HEU	  were	  
reportedly	  signed	  in	  1981	  and	  1987.19	  Use	  of	  US	  enrichment	  services	  to	  enrich	  
UK-­‐supplied	  uranium	  to	  the	  required	  level	  was	  reportedly	  formalised	  in	  the	  
1984	  amendment	  to	  the	  MDA.20	  In	  fact,	  according	  to	  the	  International	  Panel	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Foreign	  and	  Commonwealth	  Office,	  ‘Amendment	  to	  the	  Agreement	  between	  the	  Government	  of	  
the	  United	  Kingdom	  of	  Great	  Britain	  and	  Northern	  Ireland	  and	  the	  Government	  of	  the	  United	  
States	  of	  America	  for	  Cooperation	  on	  the	  Uses	  of	  Atomic	  Energy	  for	  Mutual	  Defense	  Purposes’,	  
Cm	  8996,	  Washington,	  D.C,	  22	  July	  2014,	  p.	  3.	  
15	  The	  Capenhurst	  site	  comprises	  two	  main	  facilities	  adjacent	  to	  each	  other.	  One	  is	  run	  the	  
Nuclear	  Decommissioning	  Authority	  and	  one	  by	  URENCO.	  The	  NDA	  site	  gas	  diffusion	  plant	  
ceased	  to	  operate	  in	  1982	  and	  has	  been	  decommissioned.	  The	  URENCO	  site	  produces	  low	  
enriched	  uranium	  under	  commercial	  contract	  for	  nuclear	  fuels	  and	  is	  subject	  to	  Euratom	  and	  
IAEA	  safeguards.	  In	  2011	  the	  NDA	  transferred	  its	  activities	  Capenhurst	  to	  Urenco.	  Molly	  
Berkemeier,	  Wyn	  Q.	  Bowen,	  Christopher	  Hobbs	  and	  Matthew	  Moran,	  ‘Governing	  Uranium	  in	  the	  
United	  Kingdom’,	  Danish	  Institute	  for	  International	  Studies,	  Copenhagen,	  2014,	  p.	  42.	  
16	  Since	  2006	  all	  of	  the	  uranium	  converted	  at	  the	  Springfields	  site	  comes	  as	  UO3	  from	  the	  Cameco	  
Blind	  River	  Refinery	  in	  Ontario,	  Canada,	  to	  be	  processed	  into	  UF6	  for	  Cameco	  to	  deliver	  to	  its	  
utility	  customers,	  who	  ultimately	  use	  it	  for	  fuel	  in	  nuclear	  reactors	  after	  further	  processing.	  
Berkemeier,	  et	  al,	  ‘Governing	  Uranium	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom’,	  p.	  21.	  
17	  Martin	  Bond,	  Nuclear	  Juggernaut:	  The	  Transport	  of	  Radioactive	  Materials	  (London:	  Earthscan,	  
1992),	  p.	  31.	  
18	  Ministry	  of	  Defence,	  ‘The	  United	  Kingdom's	  Defence	  Nuclear	  Weapons	  Programme:	  Plutonium	  
and	  Aldermaston	  -­‐	  An	  Historical	  Account’,	  2000,	  p.	  9.	  
19	  Bond,	  Nuclear	  Juggernaut,	  p.	  31.	  
20	  Peter	  Burt,	  ‘Reform	  not	  Renewal:	  The	  US-­‐UK	  Mutual	  Defence	  Agreement',	  Nuclear	  Information	  
Service,	  Reading,	  June	  2014,	  p.	  10.	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Fissile	  Materials	  (IPFM	  –	  a	  nongovernmental	  organisation	  that	  tracks	  HEU	  and	  
plutonium	  worldwide),	  the	  UK	  is	  estimated	  to	  have	  received	  more	  than	  half	  of	  its	  
HEU	  supply	  from	  the	  United	  States	  with	  an	  estimated	  transfer	  of	  at	  least	  14	  
tonnes.21	  
	  
The	  UK	  appears	  to	  have	  shown	  little	  interest	  in	  the	  development	  of	  LEU	  cores	  for	  
submarine	  nuclear	  reactors.	  It	  remains	  tied	  to	  the	  US	  NNPP	  programme	  for	  
materials,	  design	  and	  support	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  its	  nuclear	  weapons	  
programme,	  for	  which	  it	  also	  remains	  heavily	  dependent	  upon	  continued	  US	  
patronage.	  Unless	  and	  until	  the	  US	  NNPP	  opts	  for	  an	  LEU	  propulsion	  plant	  and	  is	  
prepared	  to	  share	  (or	  perhaps	  co-­‐develop)	  such	  a	  plant	  with	  the	  UK,	  or	  until	  the	  
UK	  terminates	  its	  nuclear-­‐powered	  submarine	  programme,	  the	  UK	  looks	  set	  to	  
power	  its	  submarine	  flotilla	  with	  current	  and	  future	  iterations	  of	  its	  HEU-­‐fuelled	  
PWR3.	  
	  
UK	  nuclear	  weapons	  policy	  is,	  like	  many	  policy	  areas,	  subject	  to	  political,	  
technical	  and	  organisational	  resistances	  to	  changes	  in	  policy	  and	  practice,	  
particularly	  those	  that	  challenge	  prevailing	  conceptions	  of	  what	  constitutes	  an	  
‘effective’	  nuclear	  deterrent	  threat	  in	  exchange	  for	  ambiguous	  non-­‐proliferation	  
benefits.	  The	  conservatism	  of	  nuclear	  policy	  communities	  has	  been	  well	  
documented.22	  This	  applies	  equally	  to	  the	  prospect	  of	  conversion	  from	  HEU	  to	  
LEU.	  Absent	  a	  change	  in	  nuclear	  mission	  requirements	  for	  its	  SSBN	  fleet	  
legitimated	  by	  a	  shift	  in	  conceptions	  of	  what	  constitutes	  an	  effective	  UK	  nuclear	  
deterrent	  threat	  and	  a	  centrally	  funded	  research,	  development	  and	  testing	  
programme	  then	  non-­‐proliferation	  concerns	  alone	  are	  unlikely	  to	  incentivise	  a	  
transition	  in	  the	  UK	  NNPP	  programme	  to	  LEU.	  
	  
2.	  The	  UK	  NNPP	  fuel	  cycle	  	  
In	  the	  absence	  of	  active	  US,	  US-­‐UK,	  or	  multilateral	  leadership	  to	  phase	  out	  HEU-­‐
fuelled	  naval	  reactors	  the	  UK	  and/or	  US	  could	  instead	  develop	  international	  best	  
practice	  for	  safeguards	  and	  transparency	  of	  HEU	  in	  naval	  nuclear	  fuel	  cycles,	  as	  
noted	  in	  the	  introduction.	  However,	  given	  the	  acrimonious	  politics	  of	  the	  nuclear	  
non-­‐proliferation	  regime,	  it	  is	  highly	  unlikely	  that	  NNWS	  will	  accept	  additional	  
legal	  safeguards	  to	  address	  this	  loophole,	  particularly	  if	  NWS	  are	  exempt.23	  
NNWS	  might	  be	  willing	  to	  negotiate	  and	  apply	  a	  voluntary	  naval	  nuclear	  fuel	  
cycle	  safeguards	  protocol	  developed	  by	  or	  in	  collaboration	  with	  NWS	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  The	  International	  Panel	  on	  Fissile	  Materials,	  Global	  Fissile	  Material	  Report	  2010,	  p.	  13.	  Available	  
at	  <http://fissilematerials.org/library/gfmr10.pdf>.	  
22	  For	  example	  in	  Janne	  Nolan,	  An	  Elusive	  Consensus:	  Nuclear	  Weapons	  and	  American	  Security	  
After	  the	  Cold	  War	  (Washington	  D.C.:	  Brookings	  Institution	  Press,	  1999)	  and	  Tom	  Sauer,	  Nuclear	  
Inertia:	  US	  Nuclear	  Weapons	  Policy	  after	  the	  Cold	  War	  (London:	  I.B.	  Taurus,	  2005).	  
23	  Resistance	  to	  voluntary	  adoption	  of	  the	  IAEA’s	  1997	  Additional	  Protocol	  as	  an	  additional	  
imposition	  on	  NNWS	  with	  IAEA	  Comprehensive	  Safeguards	  Agreements	  in	  force	  highlights	  to	  
difficulty	  of	  negotiating	  a	  NNWS-­‐only	  naval	  nuclear	  fuel	  cycle	  safeguards	  protocol.	  Mark	  Hibbs,	  
‘The	  Unspectacular	  Future	  of	  the	  IAEA	  Additional	  Protocol’,	  Proliferation	  Analysis,	  Carnegie	  
Endowment	  for	  International	  Peace,	  Washington,	  D.C.,	  26	  April	  2012.	  Available	  at	  
<http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/26/unspectacular-­‐future-­‐of-­‐iaea-­‐additional-­‐
protocol>.	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adopted	  by	  NWS	  (what	  Egel,	  Goldblum	  and	  Suzuki	  call	  a	  Naval-­‐Use	  Safeguards	  
Agreement,	  or	  NUSA	  in	  their	  working	  paper	  for	  this	  Task	  Force24).	  	  
	  
The	  UK	  is	  well	  placed	  to	  explore	  the	  modalities	  and	  limits	  of	  applying	  
international	  safeguards	  and	  additional	  transparency	  measures	  to	  its	  NNPP	  HEU	  
for	  two	  reasons:	  	  
	  
1) The	  UK	  NNPP	  is	  lean.	  It	  is	  centred	  on	  a	  handful	  of	  facilities	  and	  does	  not	  
include	  an	  enrichment	  plant.	  This	  following	  section	  provides	  an	  overview	  
of	  the	  principal	  facilities	  and	  processes	  such	  as	  is	  available	  from	  open	  
sources	  (see	  the	  map	  of	  facilities	  in	  Appendix	  2).	  The	  facilities	  are:	  
• AWE	  Aldermaston,	  Reading	  (processing	  HEU	  components).	  
• Rolls	  Royce	  Marine	  Power	  Operations	  at	  Raynesway,	  Derby	  
(reactor	  design	  and	  fuel	  fabrication).	  
• BAE	  Systems	  Maritime	  Devonshire	  Dock	  Complex,	  Barrow-­‐in-­‐
Furness	  (reactor	  core	  assembly	  and	  commissioning).	  
• Devonport	  Royal	  Dockyard	  and	  HMNB	  Devonport,	  Plymouth	  
(defueling/refueling).	  
• Nuclear	  Decommissioning	  Authority’s	  Sellafield	  site,	  Cumbria	  
(long	  term	  irradiated	  fuel	  storage).	  
	  
2) The	  UK	  has	  in	  the	  recent	  past	  self-­‐identified	  as	  a	  NWS	  committed	  to	  
nuclear	  disarmament	  and	  taking	  an	  active	  leadership	  role	  as	  a	  
‘disarmament	  laboratory’	  in	  developing	  solutions	  to	  disarmament	  




The	  UK’s	  Atomic	  Weapons	  Establishment	  (AWE)	  comprises	  AWE	  Aldermaston	  
and	  AWE	  Burghfield	  near	  Reading,	  Berkshire.	  AWE	  is	  owned	  by	  MoD	  but	  since	  
1993	  has	  been	  managed	  under	  a	  Government	  Owned	  Contractor	  Operated	  
(GOCO)	  arrangement.	  The	  current	  operator	  is	  AWE	  Management	  Ltd,	  a	  
consortium	  comprising	  Lockheed	  Martin	  Corporation,	  Jacobs	  Engineering	  Group	  
Inc.,	  and	  Serco	  Group	  plc.	  	  AWE	  Aldermaston	  stores	  and	  processes	  HEU	  for	  initial	  
fabrication	  into	  reactor	  fuel	  for	  the	  NNPP	  in	  its	  aging	  A45	  enriched	  uranium	  
handling	  facility	  that	  can	  cast,	  machine	  and	  recycle	  HEU.26	  Planning	  for	  a	  new	  
Enriched	  Uranium	  Facility	  (Project	  Pegasus)	  began	  in	  2006	  with	  the	  new	  
complex	  due	  for	  completion	  in	  2016,	  though	  this	  has	  now	  been	  extended	  to	  2020	  
after	  several	  years	  of	  delay	  and	  cost	  overruns.27	  The	  Nuclear	  Information	  Service	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  N.	  Egel,	  B.	  L.	  Goldblum,	  and	  E.	  Suzuki,	  ‘Safeguarding	  Nuclear	  Material	  in	  the	  Naval	  Sector:	  An	  
Examination	  of	  Governance	  Frameworks’,	  Nuclear	  Policy	  Working	  Group	  University	  of	  California,	  
Berkeley,	  September	  2014.	  
25	  Margaret	  Beckett	  (UK	  Foreign	  Secretary),	  ‘A	  World	  Free	  of	  Nuclear	  Weapons?’,	  Carnegie	  
International	  Nonproliferation	  Conference,	  Keynote	  Address,	  25	  June	  2007.	  
26	  Ministry	  of	  Defence,	  ‘Historical	  Accounting’.	  
27	  Peter	  Burt,	  ‘Project	  Pegasus	  –	  AWE	  Aldermaston's	  proposed	  Enriched	  Uranium	  Facility’,	  
Nuclear	  Information	  Service,	  November	  2009.	  Available	  at	  
<http://www.nuclearinfo.org/sites/default/files/AWE%20EUF%20briefing%20November%20
2009.pdf>.	  Recent	  reports	  indicate	  the	  project	  has	  been	  put	  on	  hold	  due	  to	  design	  and	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reports	  that	  the	  Pegasus	  complex	  will	  comprise	  a	  new	  receipt	  and	  dispatch	  store,	  
including	  a	  materials	  unloading	  and	  reception	  area	  and	  facilities	  for	  packaging	  
materials	  for	  on	  and	  off-­‐site	  transport.	  It	  will	  also	  include	  a	  ‘process	  building	  and	  
process	  annex	  with	  the	  equipment	  and	  workstations	  needed	  to	  manufacture	  
enriched	  uranium	  products,	  including	  casting	  facilities	  and	  furnaces,	  
electroplating	  baths,	  and	  equipment	  for	  rolling,	  heat	  treating,	  forming,	  shearing,	  
and	  machining	  uranium	  metal’,	  plus	  uranium	  storage	  vaults,	  a	  waste	  
management	  and	  processing	  area	  including	  equipment	  for	  recovering	  enriched	  
uranium	  from	  wastes,	  a	  Work	  Control	  Centre	  to	  control	  the	  movement	  of	  fissile	  
materials	  within	  the	  facility.28	  The	  Ministry	  of	  Defence	  says	  AWE’s	  enriched	  
uranium	  handling	  facilities	  are	  ‘required	  to	  maintain	  Trident	  in	  service,	  to	  
provide	  successor	  warhead	  capability,	  submarine	  reactor	  fuel	  material,	  and	  to	  
safely	  withdraw	  warheads	  at	  the	  end	  of	  their	  service	  life’.29	  	  
	  
AWE	  does	  not	  enrich	  uranium	  and	  the	  UK	  has	  no	  plans	  to	  indigenously	  produce	  
any	  more	  HEU.	  In	  2006	  MoD	  revealed	  the	  total	  audited	  stock	  of	  UK	  HEU	  at	  21.86	  
tonnes	  as	  of	  March	  2002.30	  The	  IPFM	  estimates	  that	  the	  UK	  consumed	  about	  0.7	  
tonnes	  of	  its	  HEU	  stockpile	  during	  the	  ten-­‐year	  period	  from	  2002	  to	  2012.	  
Making	  the	  conservative	  assumption	  that	  all	  of	  this	  consumption	  was	  due	  to	  
fuelling	  of	  submarines,	  the	  consumption	  rate	  for	  the	  NNPP	  is	  about	  0.07	  tonnes	  
annually.	  The	  IPFM	  also	  estimates	  that	  7.2	  tonnes	  of	  the	  UK	  stockpile	  of	  21.2	  
tonnes	  as	  of	  end	  of	  2012	  is	  devoted	  to	  the	  NNPP.	  IPFM	  therefore	  conservatively	  
estimates	  the	  UK	  has	  80	  or	  more	  years	  worth	  of	  HEU	  fuel	  for	  its	  NNPP.	  In	  
addition,	  the	  IPFM	  estimates	  that	  the	  UK	  has	  about	  11.7	  tonnes	  available	  for	  
weapons	  use	  and	  the	  UK	  has	  declared	  1.4	  tonnes	  for	  civilian	  purposes.	  Therefore,	  
given	  the	  relatively	  huge	  stockpile	  of	  available	  HEU	  for	  the	  NNPP,	  the	  UK	  is	  not	  
facing	  any	  shortfall	  pressure	  to	  switch	  to	  LEU	  for	  the	  foreseeable	  future.31	  
 
Research	  reactors	  	  
HEU	  has	  also	  been	  used	  in	  small	  quantities	  in	  a	  number	  of	  UK	  research	  reactors	  
(about	  700kg	  according	  to	  the	  International	  Panel	  on	  Fissile	  Materials),	  most	  
which	  have	  been	  shut	  down	  or	  decommissioned.32	  This	  includes	  naval	  
propulsion	  test	  reactors	  at	  the	  Vulcan	  Naval	  Reactor	  Test	  Establishment	  (NRTE),	  
formally	  HMS	  Vulcan,	  at	  Dounreay	  in	  Scotland	  operated	  by	  Rolls	  Royce	  on	  behalf	  
of	  MoD.	  The	  site	  was	  used	  to	  develop	  and	  test	  prototypes	  for	  the	  PWR1	  and	  
PWR2	  naval	  reactor	  core	  types	  as	  well	  as	  research,	  manufacture,	  fuel	  
examination	  and	  reprocessing	  of	  relatively	  small	  amounts	  of	  HEU	  test	  reactor	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
management	  problems.	  Rob	  Edwards,	  ‘Pegasus	  grounded:	  vital	  Trident	  bomb	  project	  ‘on	  hold’	  
after	  problems’,	  Sunday	  Herald,	  	  8	  March	  2015. 
28	  Ibid.	  
29	  Enriched	  Uranium	  Facility	  Initial	  Gate	  Business	  Case',	  DES/NW/PSO/555/35.	  Ministry	  of	  
Defence,	  3	  April	  2007,	  p.	  1.	  
30	  Ministry	  of	  Defence,	  ‘Historical	  Accounting’.	  
3131	  Personal	  communication	  from	  Charles	  Ferguson,	  Alexander	  Glaser	  and	  Frank	  von	  Hippel	  of	  
Princeton	  University,	  10	  March	  2015;	  see	  also	  the	  2010	  and	  2013	  Global	  Fissile	  Reports	  of	  the	  
International	  Panel	  on	  Fissile	  Materials,	  available	  at:	  http://www.fissilematerials.org.	  
32	  IPFM,	  Global	  Fissile	  Material	  Report	  2010,	  p.	  76.	  See	  also	  the	  IAEA	  Research	  Reactor	  Database	  at	  
<http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/ST/NE/NEFW/Technical-­‐Areas/RRS/databases.html>.	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fuel.33	  The	  current	  Shore	  Test	  Facility	  reactor	  at	  Dounreay	  was	  commissioned	  	  in	  
1987	  and	  houses	  the	  PWR2	  prototype	  reactor	  that	  is	  currently	  proving	  the	  
design	  of	  the	  latest	  submarine	  core.34	  The	  STF	  reactor	  has	  a	  short	  remaining	  life	  
and	  plans	  are	  underway	  to	  remove	  stored	  fuel	  in	  the	  near	  future.35	  	  
Other	  decommissioned	  reactors	  fuelled	  with	  HEU	  include	  a	  small	  high	  neutron	  
flux	  research	  reactor	  (VIPER)	  at	  AWE	  Aldermaston,	  a	  materials	  test	  reactor	  
(HERALD)	  at	  AWE	  Aldermaston,	  and	  MoD’s	  JASON	  research	  and	  training	  reactor	  
at	  Greenwich.36	  The	  UK’s	  remaining	  operational	  test	  reactors	  are	  the	  NEPTUNE	  
facility	  at	  the	  Rolls	  Royce	  Raynesway	  site	  	  (see	  below)	  and	  Dounreay’s	  Shore	  
Test	  Facility.	  	  
	  
Rolls	  Royce	  Marine	  Power	  Operations,	  Raynesway	  
Rolls	  Royce	  Marine	  Power	  Operations	  Limited	  (RRMPOL)	  operates	  two	  nuclear	  
licensed	  sites	  at	  Raynesway,	  Derby:	  a	  manufacturing	  site	  and	  the	  Neptune	  site.	  
The	  Neptune	  site	  comprises	  a	  reactor	  hall	  with	  adjoining	  fuel	  storage	  facilities,	  
radiation	  laboratories	  and	  radioactive	  waste	  management	  facilities	  and	  a	  
separate	  radioactive	  components	  handling	  facility.	  The	  low	  energy	  reactor	  is	  
used	  to	  develop	  and	  prove	  submarine	  reactor	  designs.37	  
	  
Raynesway	  is	  a	  commercially	  owned	  nuclear	  licensed	  site.	  Processed	  HEU	  for	  the	  
NNPP	  is	  transported	  by	  road	  in	  a	  fleet	  of	  High	  Security	  Vehicles	  (HSVs)	  escorted	  
by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Defence	  Police	  (MDP)	  Special	  Escort	  Group	  (SEG)	  from	  AWE	  
Aldermaston	  to	  the	  Nuclear	  Fuel	  Production	  Plant	  (NFPP,	  also	  known	  as	  the	  Core	  
Design	  and	  Manufacturing	  Site)	  at	  Raynesway.	  The	  NFPP	  comprises	  ‘the	  
chemical	  plant,	  the	  “contact”	  shop	  (covering	  operations	  with	  unclad	  material),	  
the	  “clean”	  shop	  (covering	  operations	  with	  clad	  material),	  the	  “Nuclear	  Materials	  
Services”	  (NMS)	  shop	  (covering	  manufacture	  of	  stainless	  steel	  components),	  and	  
the	  ancillaries/services	  facilities.’38	  HEU	  fuel	  components	  received	  from	  AWE	  are	  
processed	  and	  the	  submarine	  nuclear	  reactor	  cores	  are	  fabricated	  and	  
assembled.	  Core	  manufacture	  requires	  manufacturing	  fuel	  assembly	  and	  control	  
rod	  modules	  based	  on	  high	  burn	  up	  fuels	  such	  as	  uranium-­‐zirconium,	  uranium-­‐
aluminium,	  and	  metal	  ceramic	  fuels.	  Much	  of	  the	  work	  involves	  conventional	  
manufacturing	  processes	  common	  to	  other	  engineering	  industries.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  
this	  process,	  all	  the	  components	  are	  brought	  together	  and	  the	  finished	  reactor	  
core	  is	  trial	  assembled.	  The	  form	  and	  shape	  of	  HEU	  received	  from	  Aldermaston	  
changes	  through	  the	  manufacturing	  process.39	  Completed	  fuel	  assemblies	  are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Ministry	  of	  Defence,	  ‘Historical	  Accounting	  for	  UK	  Defence	  Highly	  Enriched	  Uranium’,	  March	  
2006,	  p.	  4.	  
34	  Ministry	  of	  Defence,	  ‘Nuclear	  Liabilities	  Management	  Strategy’,	  2011,	  p.	  51.	  
35	  Defence	  Safety	  and	  Environment	  Authority,	  ‘Japanese	  Earthquake	  and	  Tsunami:	  Implications	  
for	  the	  UK	  Defence	  Nuclear	  Programme	  -­‐	  A	  Regulatory	  Assessment	  by	  the	  Defence	  Nuclear	  Safety	  
Regulator’,	  July	  2012,	  p.	  31.	  
36	  Ministry	  of	  Defence,	  ‘Historical	  Accounting’,	  p.	  3;	  Bond,	  Nuclear	  Juggernaut,	  p.	  44.	  
37	  Health	  and	  Safety	  Executive,	  ‘A	  review	  by	  the	  Health	  and	  Safety	  Executive's	  Nuclear	  
Installations	  Inspectorate	  of	  the	  strategy	  of	  Rolls-­‐Royce	  Marine	  Power	  Operations	  ltd	  for	  the	  
decommissioning	  of	  its	  nuclear	  sites’,	  May	  2002.	  
38	  Office	  for	  Nuclear	  Regulation,	  ‘Project	  Assessment	  Report’,	  document	  no.	  ONR-­‐RRMPOL-­‐PAR-­‐
13-­‐003,	  July	  2013.	  Available	  at	  <http://www.onr.org.uk/pars/2013/rolls-­‐royce-­‐1.pdf>.	  
39	  Ibid.	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stored	  at	  Raynesway	  prior	  to	  delivery.	  	  
Core	  production	  is	  being	  modernised	  at	  Raynesway	  and	  in	  February	  2013	  the	  
final	  phase	  of	  a	  new	  core	  production	  facility	  was	  initiated.	  This	  is	  part	  of	  the	  UK’s	  
Core	  Production	  Capability	  Regeneration	  Project	  involving	  a	  comprehensive	  11-­‐
year	  regeneration	  of	  the	  Raynesway	  site.	  	  
BAE	  Systems	  Maritime,	  Barrow-­‐in-­‐Furness	  
The	  PWRs	  that	  power	  the	  UK’s	  attack	  and	  ballistic	  missile	  submarines	  are	  
assembled	  and	  commissioned	  at	  BAE	  Systems	  Maritime’s	  Devonshire	  Dock	  
Complex	  at	  Barrow,	  which	  is	  the	  UK’s	  only	  remaining	  submarine	  construction	  
yard.	  New	  fuel	  assemblies	  are	  transported	  by	  road	  from	  Raynesway	  to	  Barrow	  in	  
the	  form	  of	  separate	  modular	  units	  that	  are	  individually	  packaged	  into	  protective	  
containers	  called	  New	  Module	  Containers	  (NMC)	  designed	  in	  accordance	  with	  
IAEA	  standards.	  NMCs	  are	  loaded	  onto	  standard	  road	  transport	  vehicles	  and	  
escorted	  by	  the	  MDP	  SEG.40	  New	  fuel	  received	  from	  Raynesway	  is	  stored	  and	  
then	  assembled	  into	  a	  reactor	  core.	  The	  cores	  are	  installed	  into	  the	  submarine	  
reactor	  pressure	  vessel	  (RPV),	  and	  the	  finished	  reactor	  is	  then	  tested	  and	  
commissioned.	  The	  fuel	  remains	  within	  the	  RPV	  until	  it	  is	  spent	  and	  removed.	  
The	  Office	  for	  Nuclear	  Regulation	  says	  ‘The	  Site	  Safety	  Case	  allows	  nuclear	  fuel	  
for	  a	  number	  of	  cores	  to	  be	  on	  site	  at	  any	  one	  time.	  Only	  one	  reactor	  core	  is	  
permitted	  in	  any	  one	  facility	  on	  the	  site	  at	  any	  one	  time.’41	  	  
	  
HMNB	  Clyde,	  Scotland	  
HM	  Naval	  Base	  (HMNB)	  Clyde,	  north	  west	  of	  Glasgow,	  is	  not	  part	  of	  the	  UK	  NNPP	  
HEU	  fuel	  cycle	  but	  it	  does	  provide	  facilities	  for	  the	  operation,	  maintenance,	  and	  
repair	  of	  all	  classes	  of	  UK	  submarine.	  The	  base	  is	  owned	  and	  operated	  by	  the	  
MoD	  through	  the	  principal	  Clyde	  operating	  contractor,	  Babcock	  Marine	  Ltd.	  
HMNB	  Clyde	  is	  the	  base	  port	  for	  the	  Vanguard-­‐class	  SSBNs	  that	  deploy	  the	  US-­‐
designed	  and	  built	  Trident	  strategic	  nuclear	  weapon	  system.	  It	  is	  also	  the	  base	  
port	  for	  the	  Astute-­‐class	  SSNs	  and	  will	  be	  the	  base	  port	  for	  all	  remaining	  
Trafalgar-­‐class	  boats	  from	  2018.42	  	  The	  Naval	  Base	  comprises	  separate	  sites	  at	  
Faslane	  and	  Coulport.	  The	  Faslane	  site	  provides	  a	  range	  of	  nuclear	  submarine	  
support	  capabilities	  including	  facilities	  for	  the	  maintenance	  and	  repair	  of	  
submarines.	  The	  Coulport	  site	  undertakes	  the	  storage,	  processing,	  maintenance	  
and	  issue	  of	  the	  Trident	  weapon	  system	  and	  conventional	  weapons	  for	  all	  
submarines.	  Refueling	  or	  defueling	  of	  submarine	  nuclear	  reactor	  cores	  does	  not	  
take	  place	  at	  the	  Clyde	  base.	  	  
Devonport	  Royal	  Dockyard	  and	  HMNB	  Devonport,	  Plymouth	  
The	  Devonport	  site	  in	  Plymouth,	  Devon,	  comprises	  two	  adjacent	  sites:	  HMNB	  
Devonport	  and	  the	  Devonport	  Royal	  Dockyard.	  HMNB	  Devonport	  is	  the	  
homeport	  for	  the	  Trafalgar-­‐class	  attack	  submarines	  until	  2018.	  Devonport	  can	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  Ministry	  of	  Defence,	  ‘Local	  Authority	  and	  Emergency	  Services	  Information	  (LAESI)	  Edition	  8’,	  
May	  2011,	  p.	  6.	  
41	  Submission	  by	  BAE	  Systems	  to	  the	  Office	  for	  Nuclear	  Regulation	  following	  the	  Fukushima	  
nuclear	  disaster	  (no	  date	  provided).	  Available	  at	  <http://www.onr.org.uk/fukushima/bae-­‐
submission.pdf>.	  
42	  Ministry	  of	  Defence,	  ‘Nuclear	  Liabilities’,	  p.	  46.	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used	  by	  any	  of	  the	  Royal	  Navy’s	  submarines	  for	  visits,	  replenishment	  of	  stores,	  
and	  planned	  maintenance	  operations.43	  The	  Naval	  Base	  is	  owned	  and	  operated	  
by	  MoD	  and	  is	  supported	  by	  Babcock	  International	  Group	  Marine	  &	  Technology	  
Division.	  The	  Devonport	  Royal	  Dockyard	  provides	  the	  Royal	  Navy’s	  repair	  and	  
refitting	  facilities	  for	  the	  UK’s	  submarines,	  including	  reactor	  defueling	  and	  
refueling.	  Devonport	  Royal	  Dockyard	  is	  commercially	  owned	  and	  Devonport	  
Royal	  Dockyard	  Ltd	  (DRDL,	  a	  subsidiary	  of	  Babcock	  International	  Group	  plc.)	  is	  
the	  site	  operator.44	  
The	  UK’s	  nuclear-­‐powered	  submarines	  are	  currently	  defueled	  and	  refuelled	  at	  
the	  Devonport	  Royal	  Dockyard	  at	  least	  once	  during	  their	  service	  life.	  Rolls	  
Royce’s	  current	  ‘Core	  H’	  is	  designed	  to	  last	  the	  service	  life	  of	  the	  new	  Astute-­‐class	  
SSN	  thereby	  eliminating	  the	  need	  for	  mid-­‐life	  refuelling.	  All	  four	  Vanguard-­‐class	  
SSBNs	  were	  fitted	  with	  a	  ‘Core	  H’	  as	  part	  of	  their	  planned	  Long	  Overhaul	  Period	  
(Refuel)	  (or	  LOP(R))	  between	  2002	  and	  2012.	  However,	  in	  March	  2014	  MoD	  
revealed	  a	  breach	  in	  the	  fuel	  cladding	  of	  the	  PWR2	  prototype	  test	  reactor	  at	  
Dounreay	  that	  allowed	  low-­‐level	  radiation	  to	  leak	  into	  its	  sealed	  cooling	  circuit.	  	  
As	  a	  result	  a	  decision	  was	  taken	  to	  replace	  the	  core	  in	  HMS	  Vanguard	  again	  
during	  its	  next	  planned	  maintenance	  visit	  to	  Devonport	  in	  2015.45	  
Attack	  submarines	  are	  currently	  de/refuelled	  at	  the	  dockyard’s	  Submarine	  Refit	  
Complex	  (SRC).	  The	  SRC,	  located	  in	  the	  northwest	  corner	  of	  5	  Basin,	  is	  comprised	  
of	  14	  and	  15	  Docks,	  the	  Nuclear	  Support	  Facility	  (NSF)	  building,	  and	  the	  Nuclear	  
Utilities	  Building	  (NUB).46	  A	  ‘Future	  Nuclear	  Facilities’	  programme	  to	  provide	  a	  
new	  defueling	  capability	  in	  the	  Submarine	  Refit	  Complex	  is	  nearing	  completion.	  
The	  programme	  involves	  upgrading	  the	  dry	  dock	  and	  associated	  equipment	  for	  
defueling	  decommissioned	  Swiftsure	  and	  Trafalgar-­‐class	  attack	  submarines	  and,	  
in	  time,	  the	  four	  operational	  Trafalgar	  and	  new	  Astute-­‐class	  boats.	  5	  Basin	  also	  
houses	  the	  Low	  Level	  Refuelling	  Facility	  for	  the	  temporary	  storage	  of	  used	  
nuclear	  fuel	  prior	  to	  its	  departure	  off	  site	  for	  long-­‐term	  storage,	  and	  of	  new	  fuel	  
prior	  to	  its	  installation	  on	  the	  submarines.47	  Ballistic	  missile	  submarines	  are	  
de/refuelled	  in	  9	  Dock	  in	  5	  Basin.	  
	  
Defueling	  of	  submarines	  is	  currently	  carried	  out	  from	  ‘a	  mobile	  Reactor	  Access	  
House	  (RAH)	  which	  traverses	  the	  dry	  dock	  and	  is	  positioned	  above	  the	  reactor	  
compartment	  (RC)	  of	  the	  submarine.	  Access	  to	  the	  RC	  is	  gained	  by	  cutting	  holes	  
in	  the	  submarine	  pressure	  hull	  directly	  above	  the	  reactor	  pressure	  vessel	  
(RPV)….	  The	  spent	  Fuel	  Modules	  (FM)	  and	  Neutron	  Sources	  (NS)	  are	  then	  raised	  
from	  the	  RPV	  and	  temporarily	  parked	  in	  shielded	  storage	  boxes	  within	  the	  
shielded	  tank.	  The	  FM/	  NS	  is	  then	  lifted	  into	  a	  shielded	  transport	  container	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  Ibid.,	  p.	  47.	  
44Ibid.,	  p.	  48.	  
45	  Hugh	  Chalmers,	  ‘The	  UK’s	  Naval	  Nuclear	  Reactors:	  Ageing	  Ungracefully?’,	  Royal	  United	  Services	  
Institute,	  RUSI	  Analysis,	  11	  March	  2014.	  
46	  Babcock,	  ‘Decommissioning/Disposal	  Strategy:	  Submarine	  Dismantling	  –	  Facility	  Gap	  Analysis’,	  
p.	  14.	  Date	  not	  given	  but	  likely	  2011.	  Available	  at	  
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/34127/201
10815Facility_Gap_Analysis_Oct_2010U.pdf>.	  
47	  National	  Audit	  Office,	  ‘The	  Construction	  of	  Nuclear	  Submarine	  Facilities	  at	  Devonport’,	  HC	  90	  
(HMSO:	  London,	  December	  2002),	  p.	  4.	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before	  removal	  from	  the	  RAH	  to	  another	  facility	  within	  the	  Dockyard	  for	  onward	  
processing.’48	  Irradiated	  fuel	  removed	  from	  submarines	  is	  moved	  to	  a	  storage	  
facility	  for	  the	  temporary	  storage	  prior	  to	  consignment	  to	  Sellafield.49	  
	  





As	  of	  2011	  the	  UK	  had	  ten	  defueled	  decommissioned	  submarines	  stored	  afloat	  at	  
Devonport,	  four	  of	  which	  have	  been	  defueled	  as	  part	  of	  the	  De-­‐fuel,	  De-­‐equip	  and	  
Lay-­‐up	  Preparation	  (DDLP)	  process.	  The	  remaining	  six	  submarines	  have	  
received	  lay-­‐up	  preparation	  and	  are	  stored	  without	  prior	  defueling	  whilst	  new	  
defueling	  facilities	  are	  constructed	  under	  the	  Future	  Nuclear	  Facilities	  project.51	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




49	  Ministry	  of	  Defence,	  ‘Nuclear	  Liabilities’,	  p.	  48.	  
50	  Reproduced	  from	  National	  Audit	  Office,	  ‘The	  Construction	  of	  Nuclear	  Submarine	  Facilities	  at	  
Devonport’,	  HC	  90	  (HMSO:	  London,	  December	  2002),	  p.	  12.	  
51	  Ministry	  of	  Defence,	  ‘Nuclear	  Liabilities’,	  p.	  14;	  Office	  for	  Nuclear	  Regulation,	  ‘Regulation	  of	  the	  
Nuclear	  Weapon	  and	  Naval	  Nuclear	  Propulsion	  Progammes’,	  Nuclear	  Safety	  Inspection	  Guidance	  
Notice,	  NS-­‐INSP-­‐GD-­‐056	  Revision	  2,	  March	  2013,	  p.	  11.	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A	  further	  seven	  defueled	  submarines	  are	  currently	  stored	  afloat	  at	  the	  Rosyth	  
Royal	  Dockyard	  on	  the	  Firth	  of	  Forth	  in	  Scotland.	  
	  
Nuclear	  Decommissioning	  Authority’s	  Sellafield	  site,	  Cumbria	  
Irradiated	  nuclear	  reactor	  fuel	  is	  transported	  once	  or	  twice	  a	  year	  by	  rail	  to	  
Sellafield	  by	  Direct	  Rail	  Services	  (the	  UK’s	  last	  publically-­‐owned	  rail	  freight	  
company)	  in	  nuclear	  flasks.	  DRS	  was	  created	  by	  British	  Nuclear	  Fuels	  Limited	  
(BNFL)	  with	  ownership	  then	  transferred	  to	  the	  Nuclear	  Decommissioning	  
Authority	  (NDA)	  in	  2004.52	  Spent	  naval	  reactor	  fuel	  is	  placed	  in	  long-­‐term	  
storage	  in	  dedicated	  Ministry	  of	  Defence	  storage	  ponds	  at	  Sellafield	  (Sellafield	  is	  
operated	  by	  Sellafield	  Ltd	  but	  owned	  by	  the	  Nuclear	  Decommissioning	  
Authority).	  Ultimately,	  the	  spent	  fuel	  must	  either	  be	  reprocessed	  to	  recover	  
unused	  235U	  or	  sent	  for	  permanent	  disposal,	  most	  likely	  in	  a	  future	  geological	  
repository.	  MoD’s	  2001	  ‘Nuclear	  Liabilities	  Management	  Strategy’	  states:	  ‘The	  
first	  submarine	  cores	  were	  placed	  in	  Sellafield’s	  First	  Generation	  Oxide	  Storage	  
Pond.	  In	  2003,	  MoD	  commissioned	  a	  dedicated	  fuel	  storage	  pond	  at	  Sellafield	  
called	  the	  WIF	  [Wet	  Inlet	  Facility]	  that	  will	  support	  the	  continued	  safe	  and	  secure	  
storage	  of	  irradiated	  fuel	  until	  the	  end	  of	  this	  century.	  Submarine	  cores	  stored	  in	  
the	  FGOSP	  are	  being	  progressively	  transferred	  to	  the	  WIF.	  The	  FGOSP	  and	  WIF	  
are	  safe	  and	  secure	  storage	  facilities	  that	  are	  maintained	  and	  safely	  operated	  by	  
Sellafield	  Ltd.’53	  The	  WIF	  was	  available	  to	  accept	  irradiated	  fuel	  from	  December	  
2001.	  MoD	  had	  a	  contract	  with	  then	  operator	  BNFL	  to	  store	  fuel	  in	  the	  WIF	  for	  
40	  years	  through	  to	  2041.54	  In	  2002	  the	  UK	  Nuclear	  Industry	  Radioactive	  Waste	  
Executive	  (NIREX,	  or	  UK	  Nirex	  Limited	  as	  it	  became	  known55)	  reported	  in	  a	  
technical	  note	  on	  ‘Implications	  of	  Declaring	  UK	  Uranium	  Stockpiles	  as	  Waste’	  
that	  the	  UK	  had	  51	  irradiated	  submarine	  reactor	  cores	  containing	  HEU	  stored	  at	  
Sellafield	  and	  that	  by	  the	  2020	  the	  number	  could	  rise	  to	  90.56	  
	  
3.	  A	  UK	  NNPP	  safeguards	  study	  
Having	  detailed	  the	  UK	  NNPP	  fuel	  cycle	  the	  third	  and	  fourth	  sections	  of	  the	  paper	  
explore	  what	  a	  UK	  NNPP	  safeguards	  study	  and	  verification	  regime	  might	  entail.	  
First,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	  UK	  is	  perhaps	  the	  most	  politically	  inclined	  of	  the	  
NWS	  to	  explore	  the	  modalities	  of	  a	  NNPP	  fuel	  cycle	  safeguards	  regime.	  Relevant	  
precedents	  include:	  
• The	  UK-­‐Norway	  Initiative	  (UKNI)	  on	  nuclear	  warhead	  dismantlement	  
verification.	  In	  early	  2007	  representatives	  from	  the	  UK	  Ministry	  of	  
Defence,	  AWE,	  several	  Norwegian	  laboratories	  and	  the	  London-­‐based	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	  The	  NDA	  is	  a	  non-­‐departmental	  public	  body	  set	  up	  in	  April	  2005	  under	  the	  Energy	  Act	  2004	  to	  
take	  strategic	  responsibility	  for	  the	  UK’s	  civil	  nuclear	  legacy	  and	  transfer	  long-­‐term	  British	  
Nuclear	  Fuels	  Ltd	  (BNFL)	  and	  UK	  Atomic	  Energy	  Agency	  (UKAEA)	  nuclear	  decommissioning	  and	  
clean-­‐up	  liabilities	  to	  the	  public	  sector.	  
53	  Ministry	  of	  Defence,	  ‘Nuclear	  Liabilities’,	  pp.	  22-­‐23.	  
54	  A.	  S.	  Daniel	  and	  R.	  A.	  Acton,	  ‘Spent	  Fuel	  Management	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom’,	  in	  Scientific	  and	  
Technical	  Issues	  in	  the	  Management	  of	  Spent	  Fuel	  of	  Decommissioned	  Submarines,	  Sarkisov,	  A,	  
Tournyol	  du	  Clos,	  A.	  (eds)	  NATO	  Science	  Series	  (Springer:	  Netherlands,	  2006),	  p.	  62.	  
55	  Originally	  established	  by	  industry	  to	  examine	  options	  for	  geological	  disposal	  of	  radioactive	  
waste,	  ownership	  was	  transferred	  to	  the	  Department	  of	  Trade	  and	  Industry	  in	  2005	  and	  then	  to	  
the	  Nuclear	  Decommissioning	  Agency.	  
56	  Samantha	  King,	  ‘Implications	  of	  Declaring	  UK	  Uranium	  Stockpiles	  as	  Waste’,	  UK	  Nirex	  Limited,	  
Harwell,	  Oxon,	  26	  March	  2002,	  p.	  5.	  Available	  at	  <http://fissilematerials.org/library/nir02.pdf>.	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non-­‐governmental	  organisation	  VERTIC	  (Verification	  Research,	  Training	  
and	  Information	  Centre)	  began	  work	  on	  the	  technical	  verification	  of	  
nuclear	  arms	  control	  leading	  to	  a	  series	  of	  workshops,	  reports	  and	  a	  
Managed	  Access	  Exercise	  at	  AWE	  in	  2010.57	  This	  was	  part	  of	  a	  wider	  
programme	  to	  develop	  capabilities	  to	  verify	  reductions	  in	  nuclear	  
weapons	  announced	  in	  the	  1998	  Strategic	  Defence	  Review	  (SDR)	  
resulting	  in	  the	  Verification	  Research	  Programme	  at	  AWE.58	  
• Establishing	  the	  ‘P5	  process’	  under	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Defence	  Des	  
Browne	  to	  enable	  the	  five	  NWS	  to	  build	  mutual	  confidence	  and	  work	  
collectively	  on	  difficult	  technical	  issues	  associated	  with	  verified	  nuclear	  
disarmament.	  This	  began	  with	  the	  London	  Conference	  on	  Confidence	  
Building	  Measures	  towards	  Nuclear	  Disarmament	  in	  September	  2009	  and	  
was	  followed	  by	  a	  further	  five,	  the	  most	  recent	  again	  in	  London	  in	  
February	  2015.59	  
• Inviting	  a	  team	  of	  nuclear	  security	  experts	  to	  visit	  the	  UK	  in	  2011	  as	  part	  
of	  the	  International	  Physical	  Protection	  Advisory	  Service	  (IPPAS)	  to	  
assess	  the	  UK’s	  nuclear	  security	  framework,	  compliance	  with	  the	  
Convention	  on	  the	  Physical	  Protection	  of	  Nuclear	  Materials,	  and	  to	  see	  
how	  nuclear	  security	  measures	  were	  implemented	  in	  practice	  at	  Sellafield	  
and	  Barrow.	  The	  UK	  was	  the	  first	  NWS	  to	  open	  up	  its	  civil	  nuclear	  security	  
regime	  for	  inspection	  in	  this	  way.60	  
	  
The	  UK	  has,	  along	  with	  the	  other	  NWS,	  concluded	  a	  Voluntary	  Offer	  Agreement	  
with	  the	  IAEA.	  The	  UK	  agreement,	  which	  entered	  into	  force	  in	  1978,	  accepts	  
IAEA	  safeguards	  on	  ‘all	  source	  or	  special	  fissionable	  material	  in	  facilities	  or	  parts	  
thereof	  within	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  subject	  to	  exclusions	  for	  national	  security	  
reasons	  only’.61	  Under	  its	  agreement	  the	  UK	  currently	  ‘provides	  the	  IAEA	  with	  a	  
list	  of	  its	  civil	  nuclear	  facilities.	  Nuclear	  materials	  accountancy	  reports	  and	  basic	  
design	  information	  for	  all	  these	  facilities	  is	  supplied	  to	  the	  IAEA	  via	  the	  European	  
Commission	  and	  the	  IAEA	  is	  free	  to	  designate	  any	  of	  them	  for	  inspection.	  The	  UK	  
facilities	  currently	  designated	  and	  inspected	  by	  the	  IAEA	  include	  parts	  of	  the	  
Sellafield	  facility	  containing	  separated	  plutonium	  product	  from	  the	  reprocessing	  
of	  irradiated	  fuel	  and	  the	  gas	  centrifuge	  enrichment	  facility	  at	  Capenhurst.’62	  	  
	  
The	  UK	  is	  also	  subject	  to	  Euratom	  safeguards	  at	  civil	  nuclear	  sites	  under	  the	  
1973	  Euratom	  Treaty.	  Euratom	  safeguards	  cover	  natural	  uranium	  and	  uranium	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




58	  Ministry	  of	  Defence,	  Strategic	  Defence	  Review	  (HMSO:	  London,	  1998);	  Atomic	  Weapons	  
Establishment,	  Confidence,	  Security	  and	  Verification:	  The	  challenge	  of	  global	  nuclear	  weapons	  arms	  
control,	  AWE,	  Reading,	  2000.	  
59	  Nick	  Ritchie,	  ‘Pathways	  and	  Purposes	  for	  P-­‐5	  Nuclear	  Dialogue’,	  European	  Leadership	  Network,	  
July	  2013.	  
60	  Berkemeier	  et	  al	  ‘Governing	  Uranium’,	  p.	  30.	  
61	  International	  Atomic	  Energy	  Agency	  ‘INFCIRC	  263’,	  October	  1978,	  Article	  1(a),	  p.	  2.	  Available	  
at	  <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc263.pdf>.	  
62	  Office	  for	  Nuclear	  Regulation,	  ‘IAEA	  Safeguards	  in	  the	  UK’.	  Available	  at	  
<http://www.onr.org.uk/safeguards/iaeauk.htm>.	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ore	  concentrate.	  This	  included	  the	  Springfields	  uranium	  conversion	  facility	  until	  
its	  closure	  in	  August	  2014.63	  The	  UK	  has	  also	  negotiated	  an	  Additional	  Protocol	  
agreement	  with	  the	  IAEA	  and	  Euratom	  that	  came	  into	  force	  in	  2004.64	  Under	  this	  
agreement	  the	  UK	  accepted	  additional	  safeguards	  associated	  with	  the	  IAEA	  
Additional	  Protocol	  designed	  to	  detect	  undeclared	  nuclear	  material	  and	  activities	  
in	  NNWS.	  The	  UK	  makes	  declarations	  to	  the	  IAEA	  of	  nuclear-­‐related	  activities	  
conducted	  in	  collaboration	  with	  NNWS	  to	  enable	  the	  IAEA	  to	  assess	  the	  
completeness	  of	  declarations	  made	  by	  NNWS.65	  Berkemeier	  et	  al	  report	  that	  ‘All	  
the	  information	  that	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  is	  obliged	  to	  declare	  under	  the	  AP	  is	  
collected	  by	  the	  UK	  Safeguards	  Office	  at	  the	  ONR	  and	  declared	  to	  the	  Agency	  via	  
Euratom	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  British	  government.’66	  
	  
Voluntary	  adherence	  to	  INFCIRC/153	  (Corrected)	  paragraph	  14	  
A	  UK	  NNPP	  safeguards	  study	  could	  start	  by	  examining	  the	  implications	  of	  
abiding	  with	  paragraph	  14	  of	  the	  IAEA	  safeguards	  agreement	  for	  non-­‐NWS:	  ‘The	  
Structure	  and	  Content	  of	  Agreements	  between	  the	  Agency	  and	  States	  Required	  in	  
Connection	  with	  the	  Treaty	  on	  the	  Non-­‐Proliferation	  of	  Nuclear	  Weapons’,	  
otherwise	  refereed	  to	  as	  INFCIRC/153	  (Corrected),	  as	  suggested	  by	  Sébastien	  
Philippe.67	  Paragraph	  14	  concerns	  ‘Non-­‐Application	  of	  Safeguards	  to	  Nuclear	  
Material	  to	  be	  used	  in	  Non-­‐Peaceful	  Activities’.	  This	  allows	  states	  to	  remove	  
nuclear	  material	  from	  IAEA	  safeguards	  for	  use	  in	  non-­‐proscribed	  military	  
activities,	  including	  a	  naval	  nuclear	  reactor	  programme.	  
	  
The	  section	  states	  that	  if	  a	  NNWS	  intends	  to	  suspend	  IAEA	  safeguards	  for	  nuclear	  
material	  intended	  for	  use	  in	  a	  non-­‐proscribed	  military	  programme	  it	  must:	  	  
1. Inform	  the	  IAEA	  of	  the	  activity.	  
2. Make	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  material	  will	  not	  be	  used	  for	  a	  nuclear	  weapons	  
programme.	  
3. Reach	  an	  agreement	  with	  the	  Agency	  to	  identify,	  to	  the	  extent	  possible,	  
the	  period	  or	  circumstances	  during	  which	  safeguards	  will	  not	  be	  applied.	  
4. Reapply	  safeguards	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  nuclear	  material	  is	  reintroduced	  into	  a	  
peaceful	  nuclear	  activity.	  	  
5. Keep	  the	  Agency	  informed	  of	  the	  total	  quantity	  and	  composition	  of	  
unsafeguarded	  nuclear	  material	  in	  the	  State	  and	  of	  any	  exports	  of	  such	  
material.	  
	  
The	  IAEA	  says	  that	  such	  an	  agreement	  ‘shall	  only	  relate	  to	  the	  temporal	  and	  
procedural	  provisions,	  reporting	  arrangements,	  etc.,	  but	  shall	  not	  involve	  any	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  Berkemeier	  et	  al	  ‘Governing	  Uranium’,	  p.	  25.	  
64	  Office	  for	  Nuclear	  Regulation,	  ‘The	  UK’s	  Additional	  Protocol	  and	  its	  implementation’.	  Available	  
at	  <http://www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/safeguards/protocol.htm>.	  	  
65	  Bill	  McCarthy	  (Head,	  Nuclear	  Safeguards	  Policy,	  UK	  Department	  o	  Energy	  and	  Climate	  Change),	  
‘Nuclear	  Safeguards	  in	  the	  UK’,	  presentation	  to	  the	  Nuclear	  Institute	  Congress,	  14	  October	  2013.	  
66	  Berkemeier	  et	  al	  ‘Governing	  Uranium’,	  p.	  27.	  
67	  Sébastien	  Philippe,	  ‘Bringing	  Law	  to	  the	  Sea;	  Safeguarding	  the	  Naval	  Nuclear	  Fuel	  Cycle’,	  
Bulletin	  of	  the	  Atomic	  Scientists,	  9	  April	  2014.	  Available	  at	  <http://thebulletin.org/bringing-­‐law-­‐
sea-­‐safeguarding-­‐naval-­‐nuclear-­‐fuel-­‐cycle7418>.	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approval	  or	  classified	  knowledge	  of	  the	  military	  activity	  or	  relate	  to	  the	  use	  of	  
the	  nuclear	  material	  therein.’68	  
	  
A	  UK	  NNPP	  safeguards	  study	  could	  examine	  how	  it	  could	  fulfil	  these	  conditions	  
that	  a	  NNWS	  such	  as	  Brazil	  would	  be	  expected	  to	  satisfy	  in	  the	  context	  of	  its	  
uranium	  enrichment	  programme	  to	  provide	  nuclear	  fuel	  for	  its	  nuclear-­‐powered	  
attack	  submarine	  programme.	  This	  would	  be	  an	  exercise	  in	  HEU	  transparency	  
building	  on	  the	  transparency	  exercise	  conducted	  in	  the	  early	  2000s	  that	  resulted	  
in	  MoD’s	  2006	  report	  on	  ‘Historical	  Accounting	  for	  UK	  Defence	  Highly	  Enriched	  
Uranium’.	  To	  satisfy	  INFCIRC/153	  (Corrected)	  paragraph	  14	  conditions	  the	  UK	  
would	  need	  to	  consider	  the	  following:	  
	  
1. Declare	  a	  portion	  of	  its	  military	  HEU	  stockpile	  to	  the	  NNPP	  programme.	  
So	  far	  the	  United	  States	  is	  the	  only	  state	  that	  has	  publically	  declared	  a	  
separate	  stockpile	  of	  HEU	  for	  naval	  reactor	  fuel	  of	  about	  128	  tons.69	  
	  
2. Develop	  an	  independently	  verifiable	  nuclear	  material	  accountancy	  and	  
control	  regime	  to	  demonstrate	  to	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  external	  inspectors	  
that	  HEU	  dedicated	  to	  the	  NNPP	  was	  not	  being	  diverted	  to	  the	  nuclear	  
weapon	  programme	  as	  it	  moved	  from	  AWE,	  to	  Raynesway,	  to	  Devonport	  
or	  Barrow,	  and	  then	  to	  Sellafield.	  	  
	  
3. Declare	  the	  quantity	  and	  provide	  some	  details	  on	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  
HEU	  that	  did	  not	  release	  proliferative	  and/or	  military	  information	  
considered	  classified	  or	  sensitive.	  This	  could	  include:	  
• Declarations	  of	  all	  facilities	  regardless	  of	  operational	  status	  
(operational,	  closed	  down,	  decommissioned)	  and	  all	  downstream	  
facilities	  that	  store,	  process	  or	  use	  HEU	  in	  the	  NNPP	  including	  fuel	  
fabrication	  facilities	  and	  reactors.	  
• Declaration	  of	  quantities	  of	  HEU	  dedicated	  to	  the	  NNPP.	  
• Declaration	  of	  quantities	  of	  HEU	  and	  enrichment	  level	  in	  specific	  
cores.	  
• Declaration	  of	  quantities	  of	  spent	  naval	  fuel	  at	  Sellafield	  and	  in	  
decommissioned	  submarines	  at	  Devonport.	  
• Estimates	  of	  future	  HEU	  for	  the	  current	  and	  planned	  Astute	  and	  
Successor	  flotillas	  and	  additional	  cores	  for	  Vanguard	  boats	  if	  
required.70	  
	  
Managed	  access	  and	  proliferative	  information	  
In	  2010	  the	  UK	  Safeguards	  Office	  (UKSO,	  now	  part	  of	  the	  Office	  for	  Nuclear	  
Regulation)	  published	  a	  report	  on	  best	  practice	  for	  international	  safeguards	  at	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  International	  Atomic	  Energy	  Agency,	  ‘The	  Structure	  and	  Content	  of	  Agreements	  between	  the	  
Agency	  and	  States	  Required	  in	  Connection	  with	  the	  Treaty	  on	  the	  Non-­‐Proliferation	  of	  Nuclear	  
Weapons’	  (INFCIRC/153	  Corrected),	  1972	  (Austria:	  IAEA),	  p.	  5.	  
69	  Harold	  Feiveson,	  ‘Treatment	  of	  Pre-­‐existing	  Fissile	  Material	  Stocks	  in	  an	  FM(C)T’,	  UNIDIR	  
Resources,	  2010.	  Available	  at	  <http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/treatment-­‐of-­‐pre-­‐
existing-­‐fissile-­‐material-­‐stocks-­‐in-­‐an-­‐fm-­‐c-­‐t-­‐392.pdf	  >.	  
70	  Adapted	  from	  Morton	  Bremer	  Maerli,	  ‘Deep	  Seas	  and	  Deep-­‐Seated	  Secrets:	  Naval	  Nuclear	  Fuel	  
Stockpiles	  and	  the	  Need	  for	  Transparency’,	  Disarmament	  Diplomacy	  No	  49,	  August	  2000.	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UK	  nuclear	  sites.	  It	  reiterated	  that	  UK	  nuclear	  regulation	  and	  independent	  
verification	  by	  international	  nuclear	  safeguards	  inspectorates	  rests	  on	  an	  
effective	  nuclear	  material	  accountancy	  (NMA)	  and	  safeguards	  system	  that	  
encompasses:	  
• System	  wide	  accountancy	  and	  control	  structures	  
• Calibrated	  measurement	  processes,	  quality	  control,	  and	  adherence	  to	  
international	  standards	  
• Sampling	  and	  analysis	  
• Facility	  design	  to	  incorporate	  safeguard	  practices	  
• Identification	  and	  traceability	  of	  nuclear	  materials	  on	  site	  
• Storage	  controls	  and	  seals	  
• Off	  site	  receipt	  and	  issues	  of	  nuclear	  material	  
• Physical	  inventory	  taking	  (PIT)	  and	  verification	  (PIV)	  	  
• Nuclear	  material	  in	  waste	  monitoring	  and	  conditioning,	  and	  storage	  
• Commissioning	  and	  decommissioning	  
• Nuclear	  material	  customer	  contract	  management.71	  
	  
MoD	  nuclear	  material	  is	  subject	  to	  a	  similarly	  strict	  internal	  materials	  
accountancy	  regime	  to	  accurately	  account	  for	  the	  quantity	  and	  location	  of	  HEU.72	  
The	  UKSO	  2010	  report	  states	  it	  is	  ‘MOD	  policy	  to	  have	  NMA	  standards	  and	  
management	  arrangements	  that	  are,	  so	  far	  as	  reasonably	  practicable,	  at	  least	  as	  
good	  as	  those	  required	  by	  safeguards	  legislation.’73	  MoD	  would	  have	  to	  examine	  
the	  extent	  to	  which	  its	  NMA	  system	  could	  be	  opened	  up	  to	  external	  verification,	  
in	  particular	  surveillance	  to	  maintain	  continuity	  of	  knowledge	  of	  the	  status	  of	  
NNPP	  nuclear	  material	  subject	  to	  verification;	  managed	  on	  site	  observation	  of	  
on-­‐going	  operational	  activities;	  and	  disclosure	  of	  internal	  NMA	  data,	  systems	  and	  
processes	  for	  external	  audit.74	  	  
	  
There	  are	  two	  core	  challenges	  associated	  with	  such	  a	  process:	  first,	  the	  essential	  
need	  to	  prevent	  the	  release	  of	  information	  that	  could	  be	  used	  to	  develop	  nuclear	  
weapons	  (proliferative	  information);	  second,	  the	  essential	  need	  to	  protect	  
classified	  or	  sensitive	  military	  information	  from	  foreign	  inspectors	  (national	  
security	  information).	  Under	  Article	  I	  of	  the	  NPT	  the	  UK	  is	  prohibited	  from	  
revealing	  proliferation-­‐sensitive	  information,	  including	  to	  multinational	  entities	  
such	  as	  the	  IAEA	  and	  Euratom.	  During	  the	  US-­‐Russia-­‐IAEA	  1996-­‐2002	  Trilateral	  
Initiative	  to	  verify	  the	  disposition	  of	  US	  and	  Russian	  fissile	  material	  declared	  
surplus	  to	  defence	  requirements,	  the	  IAEA	  recognised	  that	  its	  access	  to	  US	  and	  
Russian	  military	  facilities	  would	  be	  restricted	  and	  that	  the	  Agency	  would	  not	  be	  
permitted	  to	  take	  unrestricted	  measurements	  of	  nuclear	  material.	  Instead,	  the	  
three	  parties	  developed	  ‘information	  barrier’	  technologies	  to	  measure	  specific	  
characteristics	  of	  nuclear	  material	  but	  only	  provide	  IAEA	  inspectors	  with	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  UK	  Safeguards	  Office,	  ‘Guidance	  on	  International	  Safeguards	  and	  Nuclear	  Material	  Accountancy	  
at	  Nuclear	  sites	  in	  the	  UK’,	  2010	  edition,	  revision	  1.	  
72	  Ministry	  of	  Defence,	  ‘Historical	  Accounting’,	  p.	  6.	  
73	  UK	  Safeguards	  Office,	  ‘Guidance	  on	  International	  Safeguards	  and	  Nuclear	  Material	  Accountancy	  
at	  Nuclear	  sites	  in	  the	  UK’,	  2010	  edition,	  revision	  1,	  p.	  32.	  
74	  Thomas	  Shea	  and	  Piet	  de	  Klerk,	  ‘On	  the	  Verification	  of	  a	  Treaty	  Banning	  the	  Production	  of	  
Fissile	  Material	  for	  use	  in	  Nuclear	  Weapons	  or	  other	  Nuclear	  Explosives:	  An	  IAEA	  Perspective’,	  
Palais	  des	  Nations,	  14-­‐15	  May	  2001,	  p.	  62	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binary	  pass/fail	  reading,	  for	  example	  that	  plutonium	  is	  present,	  that	  the	  mass	  is	  
above	  an	  agreed	  minimum,	  that	  isotopic	  composition	  is	  at	  or	  below	  specific	  
ratio.75	  The	  conflict	  between	  high-­‐quality	  verification	  to	  assure	  inspectors	  that	  
special	  nuclear	  materials	  are	  not	  being	  diverted	  and	  the	  risk	  of	  proliferating	  
sensitive	  information	  through	  intrusive	  measurements	  has	  been	  addressed	  in	  
the	  AWE’s	  Verification	  Research	  Programme	  through	  the	  further	  development	  of	  
information	  barrier	  technologies	  and	  managed	  inspector	  access	  to	  sensitive	  
military	  nuclear	  facilities.76	  	  
A	  key	  feature	  of	  a	  managed	  access	  verification	  plan	  is	  the	  ‘black	  box’:	  a	  ‘process	  
or	  facility	  where	  inspector	  access	  is	  limited	  or	  entirely	  precluded	  because	  of	  the	  
use	  of	  proprietary	  or	  classified	  technologies,	  safety,	  or	  inaccessibility’.77	  
Inspectors	  are	  granted	  limited	  access	  to	  the	  sensitive	  area	  before	  and	  after,	  but	  
not	  during,	  the	  sensitive	  operation,	  for	  example	  dismantling	  a	  nuclear	  warhead,	  
or	  machining	  HEU	  fuel	  components.	  The	  black-­‐boxed	  area	  is	  defined	  as	  a	  
material	  balance	  area	  (MBA),	  an	  area	  within	  or	  outside	  of	  a	  facility	  in	  which	  the	  
quantity	  of	  nuclear	  material	  transferred	  in	  and	  out	  of	  the	  area	  and	  the	  physical	  
inventory	  of	  nuclear	  material	  in	  an	  area	  can	  be	  determined	  through	  specified	  
procedures	  to	  establish	  the	  material	  balance	  for	  safeguards	  purposes.78	  The	  
material	  balance	  period	  (MBP)	  would	  be	  determined	  by	  host	  and	  inspectorate,	  
but	  could	  include	  a	  continuous	  inspector	  presence.	  The	  UKNI	  used	  the	  concept	  of	  
an	  enclosed	  ‘dismantlement	  cell’	  to	  which	  inspectors	  were	  granted	  managed	  
access	  before	  and	  after	  the	  dismantlement	  of	  a	  nuclear	  warhead.	  The	  cell	  could	  
be	  subject	  to	  portal	  perimeter	  continuous	  monitoring	  (PPCM)	  and/or	  closed-­‐
circuit	  television	  (CCTV)	  or	  other	  containment	  and	  surveillance	  measures	  to	  
ensure	  all	  transfers	  of	  nuclear	  material	  are	  reflected	  in	  the	  NMA	  system,	  with	  
items	  entering	  and	  exiting	  the	  cell	  subject	  to	  agreed	  chain-­‐of-­‐custody	  
procedures.79	  
The	  UK	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  take	  a	  very	  cautious	  approach	  to	  NNPP	  HEU	  fuel	  cycle	  
verification	  and	  adopt	  a	  strict	  interpretation	  of	  what	  constitutes	  proliferative	  
information,	  as	  has	  been	  the	  case	  in	  its	  programme	  of	  work	  on	  the	  verified	  
dismantlement	  of	  nuclear	  warheads.80	  Any	  changes	  to	  MoD	  operational	  practices	  
to	  accommodate	  a	  new	  safeguards	  regime	  will	  be	  subject	  to	  scrutiny	  and	  
approval	  by	  the	  safety	  regulators	  (see	  Appendix	  1)	  and	  MoD	  to	  ensure	  safety	  and	  
Defence	  Nuclear	  Programme	  requirements	  are	  met	  and	  that	  proliferative	  and	  
classified	  or	  sensitive	  military	  information	  is	  protected.	  Negotiating	  a	  managed	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  Brian	  Anderson,	  Hugh	  Beach,	  John	  Finney,	  Nick	  Ritchie,	  Ruben	  Saakyan,	  and	  Christopher	  
Watson,	  ‘Verification	  of	  Nuclear	  Weapon	  Dismantlement:	  Peer	  Review	  of	  the	  UK	  MoD	  
Programme’,	  British	  Pugwash	  Group,	  November	  2012,	  p.	  8.	  
76	  United	  Kingdom,	  ‘Verification	  of	  nuclear	  disarmament:	  second	  interim	  report	  on	  studies	  into	  
the	  verification	  of	  nuclear	  warheads	  and	  their	  components’,	  Working	  Paper,	  
NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III.WP.3,	  NPT	  Preparatory	  Committee,	  New	  York,	  April	  2004.	  
77	  H	  Diaz	  Marcano,	  E	  Miller,	  ET	  Gitau,	  J	  Wylie,	  and	  J	  Hockert,	  ‘Safeguards	  Approaches	  for	  Black	  
Box	  Processes	  or	  Facilities’,	  Pacific	  Northwest	  National	  Laboratory,	  Richland,	  Washington,	  
September	  2013,	  p.	  1.1.	  
78	  IAEA,	  ‘Safeguards	  Glossary’,	  2001	  edn.,	  IAEA,	  Vienna,	  June	  2002,	  p.	  47.	  
79	  US	  Department	  of	  Energy,	  Transparency	  and	  Verification	  Options:	  An	  Initial	  Analysis	  of	  
Approaches	  for	  Monitoring	  Warhead	  Dismantlement,	  Office	  of	  Arms	  Control	  and	  Nonproliferation,	  
May	  1997.	  Available	  at	  <http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/doe/dis/>.	  
80	  Anderson	  et	  al	  ‘Verification	  of	  Nuclear	  Weapon	  Dismantlement’,	  p.	  8.	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access	  verification	  plan	  to	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  host	  and	  inspectorate	  will	  be	  a	  
challenging	  task	  and,	  as	  AWE	  notes,	  in	  practice	  ‘no	  verification	  regime	  could	  
possibly	  be	  devised	  to	  provide	  100%	  confidence	  in	  its	  effectiveness;	  some	  
residual	  risk	  must	  remain.’81	  Defining	  a	  material	  balance	  area	  can	  be	  very	  
difficult	  for	  complex	  manufacturing	  process	  in	  large	  sites.	  The	  UKNI	  experience	  
required	  establishing	  MBA	  boundaries,	  but	  negotiating	  and	  justifying	  specific	  
boundaries	  proved	  contentious.	  
The	  UK	  will	  be	  particularly	  protective	  of	  information	  relating	  to	  reactor	  core	  
mass	  and	  enrichment	  level,	  the	  design	  of	  the	  fuel	  and	  manufacturing	  process.	  
This	  is	  seen	  as	  particularly	  sensitive	  as	  it	  could	  give	  operational	  and	  
technological	  insights	  into	  the	  power	  and	  performance	  of	  the	  core,	  how	  deep	  and	  
fast	  the	  submarines	  can	  operate,	  and	  core	  production	  techniques.	  Feiveson,	  
however,	  challenges	  such	  claims:	  
‘If	  international	  monitoring	  of	  naval	  HEU	  stockpiles	  were	  agreed,	  when	  
HEU	  was	  required	  to	  fabricate	  new	  naval-­‐reactor	  cores,	  a	  state	  would	  
have	  to	  declare	  to	  the	  IAEA	  the	  amount	  of	  HEU	  that	  it	  required	  for	  the	  
purpose.	  This	  would	  require	  states	  to	  be	  willing	  to	  declare	  to	  the	  IAEA	  the	  
quantities	  of	  HEU	  in	  specific	  cores.	  Although	  some	  states	  currently	  
classify	  this	  information,	  revealing	  it	  would	  not	  appear	  to	  reveal	  sensitive	  
performance	  characteristics,	  such	  as	  the	  maximum	  power	  output	  of	  the	  
core	  or	  how	  rapidly	  the	  power	  output	  can	  change	  or	  how	  resistant	  the	  
core	  would	  be	  to	  damage	  resulting	  from	  the	  explosions	  of	  nearby	  
torpedoes	  or	  depth	  charges.	  The	  verification	  challenge,	  which	  has	  not	  
been	  completely	  worked	  out	  yet,	  would	  be	  to	  be	  able	  to	  determine	  non-­‐
intrusively	  that	  the	  fabricated	  “cores”	  contained	  the	  agreed	  amount	  of	  
HEU	  and	  that	  the	  objects	  designated	  as	  “cores”	  were	  installed	  and	  sealed	  
into	  naval	  reactor	  pressure	  vessels.’	  82	  	  
	  
Philippe	  similarly	  argues:	  
‘Some	  information	  crucial	  for	  uranium	  accounting	  need	  not	  be	  classified.	  
For	  example,	  while	  the	  uranium	  inventory	  and	  the	  enrichment	  level	  of	  a	  
fresh	  core	  can	  give	  an	  idea	  of	  the	  maximum	  lifetime	  a	  reactor	  can	  achieve	  
before	  refueling,	  it	  gives	  little	  indication	  of	  the	  actual	  tactical	  performance	  
of	  the	  submarine	  propulsion	  system.’83	  
	  
4.	  Verification	  of	  a	  UK	  declaration84	  
When	  a	  safeguards	  agreement	  first	  enters	  into	  force	  the	  initial	  inventory	  
declaration	  is	  investigated	  closely	  to	  assure	  that	  it	  is	  complete	  and	  accurate.85	  
States	  are	  then	  required	  to	  carry	  out	  material	  balance	  annually	  and	  to	  report	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  p.	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  Harold	  Feiveson,	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  Fissile	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  Available	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existing-­‐fissile-­‐material-­‐stocks-­‐in-­‐an-­‐fm-­‐c-­‐t-­‐392.pdf	  >.	  
83	  Philippe,	  ‘Bringing	  Law	  to	  the	  Sea’.	  
84	  This	  section	  draws	  heavily	  on	  Sébastien	  Philippe,	  ‘Safeguarding	  the	  Military	  Naval	  Nuclear	  Fuel	  
Cycle’,	  Journal	  of	  Nuclear	  Materials	  Management,	  Vol.	  XLII	  No.	  3,	  2014.	  
85	  Tom	  Shea,	  ‘Reconciling	  IAEA	  Safeguards	  Requirements	  in	  a	  Treaty	  Banning	  the	  Production	  of	  
Fissile	  Material	  for	  use	  in	  Nuclear	  Weapons	  or	  other	  Nuclear	  Explosive	  Devices’,	  in	  Fissile	  
Materials:	  Scope,	  Stocks	  and	  Verification	  (Geneva:	  UNIDIR,	  1999),	  p.	  59.	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material	  unaccounted	  for	  (MUF)	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  measured	  physical	  inventory	  
and	  measured	  inventory	  changes.	  Declarations	  are	  verified	  by	  the	  IAEA	  to	  assure	  
they	  are	  complete	  and	  accurate.	  
	  
Aldermaston	  
HEU	  declared	  to	  the	  UK	  NNPP	  would	  have	  to	  be	  stored	  in	  a	  secure	  storage	  area	  
separate	  to	  HEU	  for	  the	  nuclear	  weapon	  programme,	  if	  it	  isn’t	  done	  so	  already.	  
Inspectors	  would	  be	  provided	  inventory	  data	  to	  verify	  that	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  
uranium	  enriched	  to	  above	  a	  specific	  minimum	  had	  left	  the	  country’s	  military	  
uranium	  NNPP	  stockpile	  to	  be	  processed	  into	  fuel	  components.	  Portal	  perimeter	  
continuous	  monitoring	  could	  be	  established	  and	  applied	  to	  the	  UK	  NNPP	  fissile	  
material	  stockpile.	  The	  UK	  uses	  portal	  monitors	  to	  aid	  the	  control	  of	  the	  flow	  of	  
fissile	  materials	  into	  and	  out	  of	  specified	  areas,	  including	  at	  AWE,	  to	  detect	  any	  
unauthorised	  movement	  of	  such	  materials.	  The	  UK	  states	  ‘it	  is	  possible,	  provided	  
that	  any	  security	  concerns	  are	  managed,	  that	  their	  outputs	  could	  be	  relayed	  to	  an	  
central	  verification	  centre	  external	  to	  the	  establishment’.86	  
	  
It	  is	  likely	  that	  fuel	  component	  manufacturing	  activities	  would	  need	  to	  be	  black	  
boxed	  within	  the	  current	  A45	  and	  new	  Pegasus	  EU	  Facility.	  Sébastien	  Philippe	  
outlines	  the	  use	  of	  ‘black	  box	  areas’	  to	  protect	  classified	  and	  sensitive	  fuel	  
characteristics	  and	  manufacturing	  processes.	  It	  would	  only	  be	  accessible	  to	  
inspectors	  when	  no	  production	  was	  occurring	  and	  HEU	  material	  and	  
components	  were	  absent.	  HEU	  components	  would	  be	  monitored	  when	  they	  
entered	  and	  exited	  the	  black	  box	  area	  in	  sealed	  containers.	  Inspectors	  could	  
conduct	  a	  physical	  inventory	  take	  of	  the	  agreed	  material	  balance	  area	  within	  the	  
site	  to	  satisfy	  nuclear	  material	  balance	  accounting.87	  
	  
Inspectors	  would	  not	  be	  permitted	  to	  make	  unrestricted	  measurements	  of	  
military	  nuclear	  materials,	  as	  noted	  above.	  HEU	  material	  could	  potentially	  be	  
verified	  through	  use	  of	  passive	  and	  active	  non-­‐destructive	  assay	  techniques	  
involving	  gamma	  spectroscopy	  and	  neutron	  counting	  to	  verify	  the	  presence	  of	  
highly	  enriched	  uranium	  but	  also	  the	  mass,	  isotopic	  content	  and	  geometry	  of	  the	  
fissile	  material.88	  This	  would	  be	  dependent	  upon	  development	  of	  appropriate	  
information	  barrier	  technologies	  to	  prevent	  release	  of	  proliferative	  information	  
whilst	  allowing	  inspectors	  access	  to	  sufficient	  information	  for	  verification	  
purposes.	  However,	  assuming	  the	  same	  machining	  tools	  and	  areas	  are	  used	  for	  
manufacturing	  HEU	  components	  as	  well	  as	  NNPP	  fuel	  and	  warhead	  components,	  
it	  cannot	  be	  excluded	  that	  inspections	  and	  measurements	  could	  find	  traces	  of	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86	  United	  Kingdom,	  ‘Verification	  of	  nuclear	  disarmament’,	  p.	  5.	  
87	  Philippe,	  ‘Bringing	  Law	  to	  the	  Sea’.	  See	  also	  David	  Cliff,	  Hassan	  Elbahtimy,	  and	  Andreas	  Persbo,	  
‘Verifying	  Warhead	  Dismantlement:	  Past,	  Present	  and	  Future’,	  VERTIC,	  London,	  September	  2010,	  
pp.	  78-­‐9.	  
88	  Anderson	  et	  al,	  ‘Verification	  of	  Nuclear	  Weapon	  Dismantlement’,	  pp.	  15-­‐18.	  
89	  Annette	  Schaper,	  ‘Verification	  of	  a	  Fissile	  Material	  Cut-­‐off	  Treaty’,	  Disarmament	  Forum,	  No.	  4,	  
2010	  (Geneva:	  UNIDIR),	  p.	  52.	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Rolls	  Royce	  
Tags	  and	  seals	  would	  be	  used	  on	  transport	  containers	  to	  enable	  inspectors	  to	  
trace	  HEU	  fuel	  components	  transported	  from	  AWE	  to	  Raynesway	  and	  then	  to	  
trace	  individual	  batches	  of	  fuel	  from	  Raynesway	  to	  Barrow	  and	  Devonport	  to	  
verify	  receipt	  and	  dispatch	  of	  HEU	  between	  facilities	  in	  the	  UK	  NNPP	  HEU	  fuel	  
cycle.	  The	  UK	  uses	  tags	  and	  seals	  throughout	  its	  nuclear	  weapon	  programme	  to	  
track	  warheads.	  It	  has	  also	  conducted	  studies	  of	  tags	  and	  seals	  to	  ensure	  chain-­‐
of-­‐custody	  maintenance	  for	  inspectors	  during	  transport,	  storage	  and	  
dismantlement	  of	  warheads.90	  
	  
Manufacturing	  of	  naval	  fuel	  elements	  would	  also	  have	  to	  be	  black	  boxed	  within	  
the	  NFPP	  at	  Raynesway.	  Philippe	  suggests	  that	  a	  black	  box	  area	  for	  fuel	  
fabrication	  would	  be	  connected	  to	  the	  facility’s	  fresh	  fuel	  storage	  area	  with	  a	  
single	  point	  of	  access	  monitored	  by	  cameras	  and	  that	  fuel	  assemblies	  would	  exit	  
the	  black	  box	  area	  in	  sealed	  containers	  for	  storage	  or	  transport.	  Inspectors	  could	  
verify	  235U	  content	  of	  containers,	  apply	  seals,	  and	  verify	  the	  nuclear	  material	  
balance	  of	  the	  declared	  facility	  or	  specific	  material	  balance	  area(s).	  91	  
	  
Barrow	  and	  Devonport	  
Inspectors	  would	  need	  to	  be	  able	  to	  verify	  receipt	  of	  fresh	  fuel	  assemblies	  from	  
Raynesway	  to	  Barrow	  and	  Devonport	  and	  monitor	  fuel	  elements	  placed	  in	  
storage	  pending	  the	  loading	  of	  fuel	  into	  a	  reactor.	  Philippe	  suggests	  ‘the	  
guarantee	  of	  non-­‐diversion	  of	  fissile	  materials	  would	  mostly	  rely	  on	  cask	  sealing	  
and	  tagging	  as	  well	  as	  random	  assaying	  of	  stored	  casks.	  Cameras	  could	  record	  
the	  activity	  within	  the	  building	  as	  a	  complementary	  measure.’92	  Inspectors	  
would	  then	  need	  to	  verify	  the	  assembly	  of	  the	  reactor	  core	  and	  the	  installation	  of	  
the	  core	  into	  the	  submarine’s	  reactor	  pressure	  vessel.	  Inspectors	  would,	  
however,	  undoubtedly	  be	  prohibited	  from	  seeing	  into	  the	  submarine	  and	  would	  
have	  very	  limited	  access	  to	  the	  naval	  base	  to	  prevent	  acquisition	  of	  sensitive	  
operational	  information	  relating	  to	  internal	  ship	  design,	  ship	  movements,	  
weaponry,	  military	  personnel,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  Once	  fuel	  has	  been	  loaded	  the	  HEU	  is	  
beyond	  the	  reach	  of	  inspectors.	  Nevertheless,	  Shea	  and	  de	  Klerk	  suggest	  that	  
periodic	  measurement	  of	  radiation	  within	  or	  external	  to	  docked	  naval	  vessels	  as	  
reactor	  power	  levels	  are	  varied	  would	  provide	  further	  assurance	  that	  the	  HEU	  
remains	  committed	  to	  the	  declared	  NNPP.93	  	  
	  
When	  the	  submarines	  are	  defueled	  at	  Devonport	  the	  spent	  fuel	  will	  need	  to	  be	  
accounted	  for.	  Philippe	  suggests	  that	  the	  reactor	  hatch	  (or	  in	  the	  UK’s	  case	  the	  
area	  of	  the	  hull	  to	  be	  cut	  to	  access	  the	  reactor	  pressure	  vessel)	  would	  first	  be	  
presented	  to	  inspectors	  before	  being	  opened	  and	  inspectors	  could	  verify	  that	  any	  
hatch	  seals	  in	  place	  had	  not	  been	  broken.	  The	  pressure	  vessel	  would	  then	  be	  
opened	  and	  fuel	  module	  and	  neutron	  sources	  removed	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  
inspectors.	  Individual	  fuel	  elements	  would	  be	  transferred	  to	  shielded	  transport	  
containers	  that	  could	  be	  tagged	  and	  sealed	  before	  transfer	  to	  a	  monitored	  spent	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90	  United	  Kingdom,	  ‘Verification	  of	  nuclear	  disarmament’,	  p.	  4.	  
91	  Philippe,	  ‘Safeguarding	  the	  Military	  Naval	  Nuclear	  Fuel	  Cycle’,	  p.	  47.	  
92	  Ibid.,	  p.	  48.	  
93	  Shea	  and	  de	  Klerk,	  ‘On	  the	  Verification	  a	  Treaty’,	  p.	  62	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fuel	  area	  within	  the	  Dockyard	  before	  being	  transported	  to	  Sellafield.	  Philippe	  
suggests	  ‘the	  inspectors	  seal	  every	  spent	  fuel	  cask.	  Before	  doing	  so	  a	  neutron	  
and/or	  gamma	  profiling	  of	  randomly	  selected	  fuel	  elements	  could	  be	  made	  using	  
a	  cask	  radiation	  profiling	  system.	  This	  would	  allow	  re-­‐verifying	  the	  content	  of	  
the	  casks	  at	  a	  later	  stage	  by	  comparing	  new	  radiation	  profiles	  to	  the	  baseline	  
fingerprints.’94	  Inspectors	  could	  then	  externally	  verify	  the	  absence	  of	  irradiated	  
fuel	  within	  the	  submarine’s	  pressure	  vessel	  with	  gamma	  detectors.95	  
	  
Sellafield	  
Inspectors	  would	  conduct	  inventory	  checks	  of	  receipt	  and	  storage	  of	  irradiated	  
fuel	  casks	  from	  Devonport	  in	  MoD’s	  dedicated	  Wet	  Inlet	  Facility	  fuel	  storage	  
pond	  at	  Sellafield.	  The	  inspection	  regime	  would	  involve	  off-­‐site	  monitoring	  and	  
routine	  testing	  of	  decommissioned	  cores,	  including	  thermal	  imaging.96	  
	  
5.	  Resource	  challenges	  
Accommodating	  external	  verification	  into	  the	  NNPP	  HEU	  fuel	  cycle	  would	  
present	  a	  series	  of	  challenges	  for	  MoD.	  The	  first	  is	  a	  set	  of	  challenges	  associated	  
with	  negotiating	  a	  managed	  access	  verification	  system	  with	  external	  
inspectorates,	  as	  noted	  above.	  
	  
The	  second	  involves	  facility	  design.	  Older	  facilities	  are	  likely	  to	  prove	  more	  
resistant	  to	  any	  changes	  required	  to	  facilitate	  external	  verification	  of	  NNPP	  fuel	  
cycle	  activities,	  and	  changes	  in	  physical	  organisation	  of	  sites	  and	  machinery	  as	  
well	  as	  design	  and	  implementation	  of	  externally-­‐verifiable	  safeguards	  will	  
require	  additional	  resource.	  Nevertheless,	  construction	  of	  the	  new	  Enriched	  
Uranium	  Facility	  (Project	  Pegasus)	  at	  AWE	  Aldermaston,	  the	  new	  Core	  
Production	  Capability	  at	  Rolls	  Royce’s	  Raynesway	  site,	  continued	  investment	  in	  
new	  facilities	  at	  the	  Devonport	  Royal	  Dockyard,	  and	  the	  new	  Wet	  Inlet	  Facility	  
irradiated	  fuel	  storage	  site	  at	  Sellafield	  will	  incorporate	  current	  best	  practice	  for	  
internal	  nuclear	  materials	  accountancy.	  This	  could	  potentially	  make	  external	  
verification	  of	  an	  NNPP	  HEU	  safeguards	  regime	  a	  moderately	  less	  onerous	  task.	  
	  
Finally,	  third,	  the	  NNPP	  is	  currently	  under	  strain.	  It	  is	  producing	  the	  PWR2	  H-­‐
core	  for	  the	  Astute-­‐class	  SSN	  fleet,	  designing	  and	  validating	  the	  new	  PWR3	  
reactor	  for	  the	  planned	  Successor	  SSBN,	  and	  now	  it	  also	  has	  to	  manufacture	  a	  
new	  unplanned	  replacement	  core	  for	  HMS	  Vanguard,	  plus	  an	  MoD	  option	  on	  a	  
further	  core,97	  all	  alongside	  the	  challenges	  of	  the	  system-­‐wide	  recapitalisation	  
programme	  at	  Aldermaston,	  Raynesway	  and	  Devonport.	  An	  additional	  project	  to	  
develop	  and	  test	  a	  verification	  system	  for	  the	  NNPP	  fuel	  cycle	  would	  at	  this	  time	  
be	  resisted.	  	  	  
	  
Nevertheless,	  an	  in-­‐coming	  government	  after	  the	  election	  in	  May	  2015	  could	  take	  
the	  opportunity	  to	  develop	  international	  best	  practice	  for	  safeguards	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94	  Philippe,	  ‘Safeguarding	  the	  Military	  Naval	  Nuclear	  Fuel	  Cycle’,	  p.	  48.	  
95	  Ibid.,	  p.	  49.	  
96	  Ibid.,	  p.	  49.	  
97	  National	  Audit	  Office,	  ‘Ministry	  of	  Defence:	  Major	  Projects	  Report	  2014	  and	  the	  Equipment	  
Plan	  2014	  to	  2024’,	  HC	  941-­‐I	  (London:	  NAO,	  January	  2015),	  p.	  59.	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transparency	  of	  HEU	  for	  naval	  nuclear	  fuel	  cycles.	  VERTIC	  reports	  that	  studies	  by	  
the	  US	  Department	  of	  Energy,	  the	  Trilateral	  Initiative	  and	  the	  UKNI	  all	  reach	  the	  
same	  conclusion:	  ‘it	  is	  possible	  to	  give	  inspectors	  access	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  
protecting	  the	  inspected	  party	  from	  inadvertent	  loss	  of	  classified	  information.	  
This	  conclusion	  is	  underpinned	  by	  the	  UK	  verification	  research	  programme.’98	  
The	  UK	  could	  now	  extend	  this	  process	  to	  its	  NNPP	  fuel	  cycle	  beginning	  with	  an	  
exploratory	  study	  as	  it	  did	  in	  2000	  on	  verified	  warhead	  dismantlement	  following	  
the	  policy	  decision	  set	  out	  in	  the	  1998	  SDR.99	  This	  could	  be	  an	  important	  signal	  
of	  its	  intention	  to	  contribute	  positively	  to	  the	  nuclear	  non-­‐proliferation	  regime	  at	  
a	  time	  when	  the	  regime	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  under	  significant	  pressure,	  particularly	  if	  
there	  is	  no	  agreement	  on	  a	  final	  document	  and	  work	  plan	  after	  the	  forthcoming	  
NPT	  Review	  Conference,	  also	  in	  May.	  	  
	  
Finally,	  the	  UK	  has	  an	  opportunity	  to	  work	  with	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  
upcoming	  2016	  Nuclear	  Security	  Summit	  to	  be	  convened	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  
The	  UK	  and	  US	  could	  declare	  their	  intention	  to	  move	  forward	  with	  investigation	  
of	  the	  feasibility	  of	  a	  transparency	  and	  safeguards	  programme	  for	  their	  NNPPs	  as	  
well	  as	  consideration	  of	  a	  near-­‐term	  research	  and	  development	  programme	  to	  
explore	  the	  potential	  conversion	  of	  naval	  reactors	  from	  HEU	  to	  LEU	  fuel	  for	  
subsequent	  generations	  of	  nuclear-­‐powered	  warships	  yet	  to	  be	  designed.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98	  Cliff	  et	  al,	  ‘Verifying	  Warhead	  Dismantlement’,	  p.	  89.	  
99	  Atomic	  Weapons	  Establishment,	  Confidence,	  Security	  and	  Verification.	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Appendix	  1:	  Nuclear	  regulation	  in	  the	  UK	  
	  
Defence	  nuclear	  activities	  in	  the	  UK	  are	  regulated	  by	  the	  Office	  for	  Nuclear	  
Regulation	  (ONR)	  (previously	  the	  Health	  and	  Safety	  Executive	  Nuclear	  
Installations	  Inspectorate),	  the	  Environment	  Agency	  (EA)	  and	  the	  Scottish	  
Environment	  Protection	  Agency	  (SEPA).	  Exemptions	  are	  made	  for	  the	  Defence	  
Nuclear	  Programme.	  Exempted	  activities	  are	  regulated	  by	  MoD’s	  internal	  nuclear	  
safety	  regulator,	  the	  Defence	  Nuclear	  Safety	  Regulator	  (DNSR).100	  DNSR	  directly	  
regulates	  the	  design	  and	  approval	  of	  UK	  nuclear	  warheads	  and	  naval	  reactor	  
plants.101	  Under	  DNSR	  nuclear	  weapon	  regulation	  is	  managed	  by	  the	  Nuclear	  
Weapon	  Regulator	  and	  Deputy	  Head	  (DNSR-­‐NWR)	  and	  nuclear	  propulsion	  
regulation	  by	  the	  Nuclear	  Propulsion	  Regulator	  (DNSR-­‐NPR).	  The	  Secretary	  of	  
State	  (SoS)	  for	  Defence	  formally	  delegates	  via	  the	  Permanent	  Under	  Secretary	  
(PUS)	  responsibility	  for	  safe	  conduct	  of	  defence	  activities.	  PUS	  requires	  the	  
Director,	  Defence	  Safety	  and	  Environment	  Authority	  (D	  DSEA)	  to	  appoint	  and	  
manage	  the	  Regulator.	  Authority	  is	  delegated	  to	  DNSR-­‐Hd	  to	  require	  Defence	  
Nuclear	  Programme	  (DNP)	  operations	  to	  cease	  in	  extremis.102	  The	  DNP	  
encompasses	  the	  Nuclear	  Weapons	  Programme	  (NWP)	  and	  Naval	  Nuclear	  
Propulsion	  Programme	  (NNPP).	  DNSR	  sets	  regulatory	  policy	  for	  the	  DNP	  and	  
provides	  assurance	  to	  the	  defence	  secretary	  via	  DSEA	  and	  PUS.	  In	  MoD’s	  Defence	  
Equipment	  and	  Support	  (DE&S)	  organisation	  the	  Nuclear	  Propulsion	  Project	  
Team	  (NP-­‐PT)	  provides	  in	  service	  support	  relating	  to	  reactor	  plant	  readiness	  for	  
operation.	  It	  controls	  associated	  work	  undertaken	  by	  the	  Nuclear	  Steam	  Raising	  
Plant	  (NSRP)	  Technical	  Authority	  (Rolls	  Royce	  Submarines)	  and	  is	  the	  formal	  
DNSR	  authorisee	  for	  operation	  of	  the	  Naval	  Reactor	  Propulsion	  Plant	  at	  sea	  and	  
operational	  berths.	  
	  
Raynesway	  is	  a	  licensed	  nuclear	  site	  solely	  regulated	  by	  the	  ONR.	  AWE	  
Aldermaston	  and	  its	  sister	  site	  AWE	  Burghfield	  are	  licensed	  by	  the	  ONR.	  DNSR	  
authorises	  and	  regulates	  specific	  nuclear	  activities,	  primarily	  those	  exempt	  from	  
the	  licensing	  requirement	  of	  the	  Nuclear	  Installations	  Act.	  The	  ONR	  regulates	  
HMNB	  Clyde,	  HMNB	  Devonport,	  and	  Vulcan	  Nuclear	  Test	  Reactor	  Establishment	  
(NRTE)	  in	  accordance	  with	  applicable	  legislation,	  but	  all	  nuclear	  activities	  at	  the	  
sites	  are	  authorised	  and	  regulated	  by	  DNSR.	  The	  Barrow	  site	  is	  licensed	  by	  the	  
ONR	  for	  nuclear	  fuel	  storage	  and	  handing.	  DNSR	  authorises	  and	  regulates	  
specific	  exempted	  nuclear	  activities,	  including	  initial	  testing	  of	  the	  nuclear	  
reactor.	  In	  practice,	  Barrow	  has	  regulated	  areas	  split	  between	  ONR	  and	  DNSR	  
with	  much	  joint	  regulation	  and	  coordination.103	  
	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100	  Ministry	  of	  Defence,	  ‘Nuclear	  Liabilities’,	  p.	  15.	  
101	  Defence	  Safety	  and	  Environment	  Authority,	  ‘Japanese	  Earthquake	  and	  Tsunami:	  Implications	  
for	  the	  UK	  Defence	  Nuclear	  Programme	  -­‐	  A	  Regulatory	  Assessment	  by	  the	  Defence	  Nuclear	  Safety	  
Regulator’,	  July	  2012,	  p.	  15.	  
102	  Ministry	  of	  Defence,	  ‘JSP	  518:	  Regulation	  of	  the	  Naval	  Nuclear	  Propulsion	  Programme’,	  Part	  1:	  
Directive,	  July	  2014,	  p.	  4.	  
103	  Ministry	  of	  Defence,	  ‘Nuclear	  Liabilities’,	  p.	  44-­‐46;	  Office	  for	  Nuclear	  Regulation,	  ‘Regulation	  of	  
the	  Nuclear	  Weapon	  and	  Naval	  Nuclear	  Propulsion	  Programmes’,	  Nuclear	  Safety	  Inspection	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Acronyms	  
	  
AWE	   	   Atomic	  Weapons	  Establishment	  
DNP	   	   Defence	  Nuclear	  Programme	  
DRDL	   	   Devonport	  Royal	  Dockyard	  Limited	  
EA	   	   Environment	  Agency	  
EUF	   	   Enriched	  uranium	  facility	  
HMNB	  	   Her	  Majesty’s	  Naval	  Base	  
HEU	   	   Highly	  enriched	  uranium	  
IPFM	   	   International	  Panel	  on	  Fissile	  Materials	  
LEU	   	   Low	  enriched	  uranium	  
LOP(R)	  	   Long	  Overhaul	  Period	  (Refuel)	  
MBA	  	   	   Material	  balance	  area	  
MBP	   	   Material	  balance	  period	  	  
MDA	   	   Mutual	  Defence	  Agreement	  
MDP	  SEG	   Ministry	  of	  Defence	  Police	  Special	  Escort	  Group	  
MUFC	   	   Maritime	  Underwater	  Future	  Capability	  
NDA	   	   Nuclear	  Decommissioning	  Authority	  
NFPP	   	   Nuclear	  fuel	  production	  plant	  
NMA	   	   Nuclear	  material	  accountancy	  	  
NNPP	   	   Naval	  Nuclear	  Propulsion	  Programme	  
NNWS	  	   Non-­‐nuclear	  weapon	  state	  
NPT	   	   Non-­‐Proliferation	  Treaty	  
NRTE	   	   Naval	  Reactor	  Test	  Establishment	  	  
NSRP	   	   Nuclear	  steam	  raising	  plant	  
NWP	   	   Nuclear	  weapon	  programme	  
NWS	   	   Nuclear	  weapon	  state	  
ONR	  	   	   Office	  for	  Nuclear	  Regulation	  
PPCM	   	   Portal	  perimeter	  continuous	  monitoring	  	  
PSA	   	   Polaris	  Sales	  Agreement	  
PWR	   	   Pressurised	  water	  reactor	  
RPV	   	   Reactor	  pressure	  vessel	  
RRMPOL	  	   Rolls	  Royce	  Marine	  Power	  Operations	  Limited	  
SDR	   	   Strategic	  Defence	  Review	  
SEPA	   	   Scottish	  Environment	  Protection	  Agency	  
SRF	   	   Submarine	  Refit	  Complex	  	  
STF	   	   Shore	  Test	  Facility	  
UKNI	   	   United	  Kingdom-­‐Norway	  Initiative	  
UKSO	   	   UK	  Safeguards	  Office	  
WIF	   	   Wet	  Inlet	  Facility	  
VERTIC	   Verification	  Research,	  Training	  and	  Information	  Centre	  
